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The problem with current international disaster relief is ineffective 
communication, coordination, cooperation, and collaboration (4C). Ineffective 
international 4C allows chaos and anarchy to significantly hinder disaster-relief 
efforts. 
After action reports (AARs) and disaster relief (DR) materials were 
examined to identify system-level issues during DR missions. These issues were 
examined to determine if DR exhibits characteristics of a wicked problem.  
The results of systems-thinking analysis show that anarchy, social 
complexity, and stress within the DR system have a negative impact on all 
components of the system. To improve the effectiveness of DR missions and 
help mission teams to present a unified front for DR, anarchy, social complexity, 
and stress must be reduced. 
This work proposes a communication strategy for DR missions that 
harnesses capabilities of information communication and technology (ICT) 
solutions, introduces a cloud-based hierarchical trust model, and outlines a 
common integration interface. The strategy encourages open and transparent 4C 
between DR mission teams and the international DR community. Properly 
implemented, this communication strategy could reduce system-level anarchy 
and social complexity, resulting in reduced post-disaster damage, injuries, and 
loss of life.   
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 1
 THESIS OVERVIEW I.
A. INTRODUCTION 
A disaster can occur anywhere with little to no warning. The devastating 
effects of disasters have global implications. For example, in December 2004, an 
earthquake in Indonesia formed a series of tsunamis that resulted in the death of 
approximately 230,000 people in Southeast Asia.1 In August 2005, Hurricane 
Katrina wiped out most of New Orleans and the Mississippi delta.2 In January 
2010, an earthquake in Haiti destroyed the infrastructure, resulting in more than 
220,000 deaths.3 Finally, in November 2012, Typhoon Haiyan ravaged the 
islands of the Philippines, affecting over thirteen million people throughout the 
Pacific.4  
Disasters provide the international community with opportunities to work 
together to help victims recover from disasters. As fellow inhabitants of this  
orb, we must do everything in our power to provide support and stability to  
the victims and governments that are affected. The stakeholders in disaster  
relief (DR) include all parties impacted by disasters. Stakeholders include the 
victims and their families, early responders, governments, militaries, commercial 
organizations, non-profit organizations, and essentially every country on the 
planet.  
Over the last sixty years, stakeholders have attempted to improve support 
for disaster relief through organizational restructuring, establishing national 
                                            
1. Raziye Akkoc, “2004 Boxing Day Tsunami Facts,” The Telegraph, Accessed 3 March 
2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/11303114/2004-Boxing-Day-tsunami-
facts.html. 
2. Bryan L. Bradford, Steve Urrea, and Brian Steckler, “After Action Report and Lessons 
Learned from The Naval Postgraduate School’s Response to Hurricane Katrina” (master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, September 2005), 2–231.  
3. Brian Steckler, “Hastily Formed Networks in Haiti, Haiti Earthquake After Action Report and 
Lessons Learned (AAR/LL)” (Naval Postgraduate School, 8 September 2010), 1–23. 
4. Joshua Wadell and Brian Steckler, “Marine C2 in support of HA/DR: Observations and 
Critical Assessments Following Super-Typhoon Haiyan” (19th International Command and 
Control Research and Technology Symposium, 2013). 
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policies, and implementing innovative technologies. International organizations, 
such as the United Nations, changed their organizational structures to provide 
organization and stability to the victims of disasters.5 National policies, such as 
the U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review, express the nation’s intent to support DR 
efforts. International DR mission teams are harnessing cutting-edge technologies 
to provide on-site relief assistance to the people affected by disasters. 
Organizations provide innovative platforms to facilitate collaboration and 
situational awareness for DR missions. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The United Nations states “governments and militaries are systems that 
have a major role in disaster relief and assistance.”6 Prior to the Internet boom, 
they were the best systems for organizing relief efforts and providing services 
and resources in a disaster7: “The old way of doing things made the hierarchy 
entirely responsible for the outcome, be that the government, the military or 
whatever entity was at the top of the hierarchy.”8 This includes failures due to 
factors outside of the organization’s control.  
This problem becomes more complex when multiple (country, state, and 
city) governments become involved, each with its own culture of responsibility 
and methods of dealing with failure. Governments and militaries of the same 
nation-state have different standards, processes, and procedures. When dealing 
with complex events jointly, these standards, processes, and procedures can 
create internal conflict. This situation is further complicated by the lack of 
                                            
5. United Nations, UN Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Officer Field Handbook (Office 






international legislation and alignment between civil and military entities that deal 
with joint concerns inherent in disaster relief.9  
This also leads to the development of “dysfunction in the system.”10 
Hidden agendas, compartmentalization, proprietary information, information 
hoarding, and trust issues reduce the willingness for organizations to work 
together constructively. Past assumptions were that the government, military, 
and other hierarchical organizations best understood the situation because they 
possessed the best channels of communication and the resources needed to 
address the problems.11  
Disaster relief (DR) is an international based system of systems because 
its individual components are part of another complex system. All subsystems 
within DR, governments, militaries, nongovernmental organizations, commercial 
organizations, and victims of the disaster constitute the system-level 
stakeholders. The internal issues inherent in the subsystems compound issues 
within the DR system. Some of the main issues within the DR system are the 
lack of command and control, common collaboration and situational awareness, 
and communication enabling capability.  
To correct these issues the stakeholders worked independently to provide 
solutions to the system-wide issues of DR. The United Nations established the 
cluster system,12 the U.S. Government established the All Partners Access 
Network (APAN),13 and the commercial sector developed information and 
communications technology deployment kits. All of these solutions provided key 
functions to resolve issues identified within the DR system. The restructuring and 
technological advancements represented an unparalleled capability for the relief 




12. United Nations, “About,” Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Accessed 23 
September 2014, http://www.humanitarianresponse.info/about. 
13. All Partners Access Network. “About page,” accessed 26 October 2014. 
https://community.apan.org/p/about.aspx.    
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effort. These solutions improved communications, coordination, cooperation, and 
collaboration between the responders and resulted in lives saved. However, due 
to legislative issues, information hoarding, and complex social implications of 
interdependent systems, the solutions only treat the symptoms of the system-
level problem in DR. These solutions do not resolve problems at the system level 
for DR. 
Today, a new, less hierarchical system of organizations and information 
streams addresses the wicked problem of disaster. Problems that are considered 
wicked are very complex and possess significant social implications due to the 
variety of stakeholders. These less hierarchical systems are ad hoc, disjointed, 
and have their own problems. The new dysfunctions are in some ways, the same 
as the old dysfunctions: information hoarding to maintain control, avoid blame, 
get credit and recognition, and improve one’s performance over one’s 
competitors. However, the new flatter, more diverse system also results in 
information fragmentation as more and more people hold critical pieces of 
information. Critical information is then only partially shared with friends or 
aligned agencies. One of the incentives for this information hoarding is to not 
reveal one’s own miss-steps and miscalculations. 
The lack of open sharing fragments and complicates DR teams’ 
interactions on the ground. Fragmentation of critical information distribution 
reduces response quality and unintentionally injects anarchy into the system. 
Attempts to repair this fragmentation, selectively creates multiple information 
sharing solutions that confuse teams attempting to cooperate.14 Multiple 
information sharing sources create a feeling of information overload, which could 
reduce the desire for the teams to work together in a synchronized manner. 
 The issues mentioned reflect the nature and relationships of 
interdependent components in today’s DR system of systems. The 
                                            
14. Larry Wentz, “Haiti Information and Communications Observations: Trip report for Visit 18 
February to 1 March 2010,” Center for Technology and National Security (National Defense 
University, Washington, DC, 08 August 2010). 
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interdependencies work in concert to increase system-level anarchy.15 Anarchy 
in the DR system is the ultimate state of disorder, uncertainty, instability, 
insecurity, and identification of leadership. A fragmented and disjointed response 
along with increased anarchy, results in avoidable post-disaster injuries and 
deaths, especially within the first 72 hours. Figure 1 illustrates some system-level 
variables that have a significant impact on the current DR system. 
Looking at the social challenges within international disaster relief (DR) 
missions, some organizations’ agendas and aspirations take precedence over 
providing relief to the victims.16 Eyewitness testimony identifies this behavior 
occurring during Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and again in the 2012 Philippine 
mission.17 The victims and their governments do not want mission teams to take 
over and impose foreign value systems, but they do desire assistance with 
locating lost family members and recovering from the disaster.18 The victims are 
simply trying to survive in the aftermath of the disaster and do not care about 
organizational agendas and objectives.19 Disaster relief is about working together 
as a community to provide life-saving efforts, support, and aid to the victims of a 
disaster.20 
In order for the international community to successfully provide this 
service, responders should present a synchronized, unified front. The 
international community should develop ways to encourage open and 
transparent information sharing. The international community should work 
together to develop a functional communications strategy for DR. For a 
                                            
15. Nancy Roberts, “Coping with Wicked Problems” Classroom Instruction (Monterey, CA, 22 
September–18 December 2014). 
16. Brian Steckler, “Hastily Formed Networks for HA/DR,” Classroom Instruction (Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 22 June–16 September 2014). 
17. Ibid. 
18. Ibid. 
19. Victoria Richards, “Cyclone Pam: Vanuatu will run out of food “in a week” as officials slam 





communications strategy to change DR at the system level, the international 
community must embrace a communications strategy that increases 
communication,21 coordination,22 cooperation,23 and collaboration24 (4C) 
between disaster relief mission teams. This is the 4C approach or framework.  
The 4C approach involves setting up the conditions that: (1) encourage 
free flow of communication among diverse holders of information;  (2) provide 
the capability to identify and share the critical information needed for individual, 
independent or semi-independent actors to know more about the “big picture” of 
events, problems, needs, and activities so they can coordinate their actions 
and activities with other actors;  (3) assist actors in the system to identify gaps 
and issues that require cooperation among actors; and (4) encourage 
collaboration by promoting limited, contextualized trust among actors who 
might, in other situations, see one another as rivals, competitors or even 
adversaries. 
Based on systems-level research, the author developed the 4C framework 
to address key variables within the DR system. Reduced 4C during disaster relief 
missions diminishes the quality of the relief, increases the duration of the 
mission, and presents an unsynchronized, non-unified front. The lack of a non-
unified front for disaster relief missions increases a kind of anarchy that can 
result in preventable post-disaster damage, injuries, and loss of life.    
This thesis analyzes the DR system and its social complexities. It frames 
the system-level problem, and identifies the system-level solution entry point. 
                                            
21. MR3 Inc. and Black Swan Solutions, “Communicating in a Crisis,” MR3 and Black Swan 
Solutions Joint Webinar, 20 January 2015. http://www.mir3.com/mir3-inc-and-black-swan-
solutions-present-joint-webinar-on-communicating-in-a-crisis/. 
22. Nancy Roberts, “Coping with Wicked Problems” Classroom Instruction (Monterey, CA, 22 
September–18 December 2014). 
23. Ibid. 
24. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, “Request for Information (RFI): Strategic 




Based on the findings, this thesis proposes a communications strategy concepts 
designed to reduce the overall anarchy within the system. A reduction in anarchy 
within the DR system could potentially reduce post-disaster damage, injuries, 
and loss of life.  
  
Figure 1.  Disaster Relief Vicious Cycle.25 
C. STRUCTURE AND SCOPE 
In Chapter II, this thesis discusses solutions implemented to address 
specific problems of communication within DR. It continues with an introduction 
to current information and communications technology (ICT) example and 
explores significant issues identified from DR missions. Chapter II further 
provides a brief summary of past and present implementations, elucidating and 
justifying how previous solutions have failed to reduce information anarchy within 
                                            
25. Anderson, Virginia and Lauren Johnson, Systems Thinking Basics: From Concepts to 
Causal Loop (Waltham, MA: Pegasus Communications, 1997). 
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the DR system.26  Information anarchy is the problem of disjointed, ad hoc 
information sharing and the poor situation awareness that results from a system 
that fails to promote or encourage the free flow of communications, impeding 
coordination, discouraging cooperative behavior, and providing very limited 
incentives for collaboration (i.e., “reduced 4C”).  
Chapter III introduces the concept of wicked problems. It then compares 
the issues in DR with known characteristics of wicked problems to formally 
identify it as a wicked problem with system-level issues. The chapter then 
explores the DR system using the Systems Thinking process. The Systems 
Thinking process allows a better understanding of the physical characteristics 
and social implications of the problem space. The chapter continues with an 
introduction to injection points and balancing mechanisms.27 Injection points and 
balancing mechanisms depict a section within the system where a solution may 
reduce the anarchy within the DR system.28 
Chapter IV begins with an introduction to a communication strategy for DR 
missions. The communications strategy combines an ICT capability with a cloud 
based, decentralized, integrated 4C interface concept. This chapter continues 
with a design structure proposal for the integration interface concept. The 
discussion concludes with a brief overview of security implications for the 
proposed concept model and a short summary of the combined communication 
strategy. 
 Chapter V introduces some general security considerations. The chapter 
addresses security of data-at-rest and data-in-transit. The chapter approaches 
security considerations of critical components of the security strategy. 
                                            
26. Rebecca Goolsby, telephone call with author, 5 March 2015. 
27. Anderson, Virginia and Lauren Johnson, Systems Thinking Basics: From Concepts to 
Causal Loop (Waltham, MA: Pegasus Communications, 1997), 2–21. 
28. Ibid. 
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The thesis conclusion provides a summary of the concepts discussed in 
the thesis. Conceptually, creating an internationally accepted communication 
strategy reduces DR system-level anarchy.  
D. BENEFITS OF THE THESIS 
The 2014 U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) states the following: 
“Protect the homeland, to deter and defeat attacks on the United States and to 
support civil authorities in mitigating the effects of potential attacks and natural 
disasters.”29 Another key goal in the QDR is to “Project power and win decisively, 
to defeat aggression, disrupt and destroy terrorist networks, and provide 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.”30 
To maintain compliance with this mandate, the Department of Defense 
(DOD) and the U.S. government must work with the international community to 
support disaster relief (DR) missions. This thesis investigates potential solutions 
that support compliance with the 2014 QDR.31 
From an international DR stakeholder perspective, this document 
represents a preliminary model of framing the problem space within the DR 
system. By analyzing the broader system-level problems within the DR system, 
mission stakeholders can refine this concept to design solutions that reduce 
anarchy within the system. Furthermore, the implementation of a 
communications strategy has the potential to encourage open and transparent 
communication, coordination, cooperation, and collaboration (4C) within the 
international community. 
                                            
29. U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 (Washington, DC: Office 
of the Secretary of Defense, March 2014), V  
30. Ibid. 
31. U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 (Washington, DC: Office 
of the Secretary of Defense, March 2014), 22, 25, 33. 
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 BACKGROUND II.
A. PREVIOUS AND CURRENT SOLUTIONS 
Over the last 60 years, many different concepts have been independently 
introduced to correct known DR shortfalls. The implemented solutions added 
organization and enabled communications, but lacked the impact and support to 
encourage international open 4C participation for DR missions. These solutions 
succeeded in treating the symptoms of the problem but failed to address the 
system-level problem. Solutions that treat symptoms of system-level problems 
will likely result in adding new unanticipated problems.  
The sections that follow briefly introduce previous and current solutions for 
DR:  
 Organization solutions 
 Collaborative solutions 
 Communication enabling solutions  
1. Organization Solutions 
In 1942, the United Nations (UN) was established to promote international 
cooperation and to combat Axis powers.32 In 1945, the United Nations Charter 
was ratified bringing 50 nation states into an allegiance to promote peace.33 Over 
several decades, the United Nations added members and changed through 
collaborative planning.34 
 In 1991, the UN convened and passed the General Assembly Resolution 
46/182, which set the foundation for UN DR missions.35 In 2005, the 
 
                                            




35. United Nations, “About,” Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, accessed 23 
September 2014, http://www.humanitarianresponse.info/about.  
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Humanitarian Reform Agenda introduced several changes within the UN to 
address identified issues with predictability, accountability, and partnership.36 
The Reform Agenda passed legislation to reorganize the UN into clusters.37 A 
cluster is a group of organizations or stakeholders, with a designated leader, 
working in a specified area designed to fill existing capability gaps.38 Figure 2 
represents the UN organizational cluster system. Despite the organizational 
cluster system of the United Nations, information anarchy remains a constant 
problem throughout the DR system.39  
                                            
36. United Nations, “What is the Cluster Approach?” Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, assessed 26 October 2014, 
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37.  Ibid. 
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Figure 2.  United Nations Cluster System.40 
One of the main issues with an organization restructuring solution is that it 
is internal to the organization and is not applied or accepted globally. There is no 
official legislation appointing an organization as a recognized international body 
for DR. The design of the UN Cluster System is not the reason that the 
organizational restructuring solution continues to fail. The lack of international 
trust and social complexity of an international DR mission simply does not 
support a centralized command structure. This could be an advantage, as a 
flatter organization structure can be more agile in disasters. Actors with limited 
trust among themselves have more freedom to act individually or in concert with 
                                            
40. United Nations, “What is the Cluster Approach?” Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, assessed 26 October 2014, 
http://www.humanitarianresponse.info/clusters/space/page/what-cluster-approach. 
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only highly trusted partners; further, they are weighed down with fewer obstacles 
to acting. However, the cluster system provides problems for information flow 
that lead to situations of reduced 4C (lack of communication, coordination, 
cooperation, and collaboration) so that even information flow among trusted 
partners is fragmented, disjointed, and partial. This has long been a recognized 
problem, with a number of attempts to solve it in the last two decades.  
2. Collaborative Solutions 
Over the last decade, many different vendors developed solutions to 
provide a medium for international DR collaboration. These collaborative 
solutions provided vital capabilities to the international community and DR 
stakeholders. Many of the collaborative solutions are still in use today. One of the 
solutions currently in use is the All Partner Access Network (APAN) website.  
APAN was originally developed and implemented in 1997 for the United 
States Pacific Command (PACOM).41 The portal provides a community space for 
collaboration between international mission teams.42 There are several reasons 
APAN is not widely embraced internationally. Wentz’s observation report 
describes these barriers. First, the U.S. Armed Forces developed and currently 
manages APAN. Second, creating an APAN user account requires the user to 
provide a good deal of personal information. The international community as a 
whole does not maintain a mutual transparent trust relationship with the U.S. 
Armed Forces. The lack of transparency and compartmentalization practices, 
used within the U.S. Armed Forces, discourages open sharing across the 
international DR community. Furthermore, in some countries, cooperation with 
the U.S. military may put the lives of participants and their families in danger. The 
distrust between DR entities ultimately inspired the international community to 
develop and rely on its own collaborative solutions.   
                                            
41. All Partners Access Network, “About page,” accessed 26 October 2014, 
https://community.apan.org/p/about.aspx.    
42. Ibid. 
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Other problems with APAN acceptance include the problem of getting all 
players to accept the centralized access model for distributing information and 
inefficiencies within the platform itself.43 AARs from the international community 
also identify issues with the centralized access control model and platform 
inefficiencies. To access resources on APAN, individuals must request 
permission to a specific resource or group, justify their request to a higher 
authority, and wait for access. A centralized model that introduces layers of 
bureaucracy into a collaboration system will likely foster distrust and discourage 
open sharing.  
Most of the collaborative solutions developed over the years support a 
hierarchical and centralized model. Instead of allowing the governing body 
affected by the disaster to lead collaboration efforts, previous models rely on the 
solution provider as collaboration lead for DR events. The social complexities of 
DR, combined with the centralized models of collaboration, do not support an 
open and transparent relationship. International distrust between teams and 
distributed information increases confusion and anarchy in the DR system.44  
As was the case in 2011 and still today, no singularly recognized 
international platform successfully encourages open and transparent 
collaboration.45 For a collaborative solution to be internationally accepted, the 
model used must inspire open and transparent sharing of information.  
3. Information and Communications Technology Solutions 
In today’s world of crisis response, reliable global communications is the 
essential foundation for success for DR efforts. Search and rescue operations, 
the establishment of aid stations, and the coordination of lift and drop of essential 
                                            
43. Larry Wentz, “Haiti Information and Communications Observations: Trip report for Visit 18 
February to 1 March 2010,” Center for Technology and National Security (National Defense 
University, Washington, DC, 08 August 2010). 
44. Ibid. 
45. Naim Kapucu Ph.D., “Collaborative governance in international disasters: Nargis Cyclone 
in Myanmar and Sichuan Earthquake in China cases,” International Journal of Emergency 
Management, 8(1). 2011, 1–25. 
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supplies and resource—every essential element of the response needs 
communication (and power). Communications, coordination, cooperation, and 
collaboration (4C) for disaster relief missions require a network connection. 
Implementing a mobile contingency communications package or information 
communications and technology (ICT) constitutes another solution developed to 
enable 4C for mission teams. ICT is a communications enabler and provides a 
required connection capability for the responder teams. The ability of teams to 
communicate when normal communication infrastructure goes down is an 
invaluable asset to international DR. With the demand for DR ICT solutions high, 
many ICT providers saw a need to fill the gap. As a result, there are hundreds of 
communications enabling solutions available. 
With all of these solutions available, users are bound to encounter some 
interoperability issues. Interoperability issues can ultimately affect the ability of a 
DR team to successfully communicate. If the mission teams are incapable of 
effectively coordinating with participating teams, they may inadvertently become 
centrally located. Satellite bandwidth saturation can quickly become an issue 
when a significant number of satellite based ICTs, operating on the same 
frequency band, deploy to a small geographical area.46  
ICT packages are comprised of computer and network equipment. ICT 
packages equip small to large teams with network connection capability in areas 
that have limited power and communications resources. ICT packages are critical 
components for participating in communication, coordination, cooperation, and 
collaboration (4C) during disaster relief missions. 4C activities provide a means 
to increase relief effort response quality, ultimately resulting in saving lives. When 
used effectively, an ICT capability enables communication and facilitates 
coordination between mission teams on the ground. One such example of an 
effective ICT is Hastily Formed Networks. 
                                            
46. Brian Steckler, “Hastily Formed Networks in Haiti. Haiti Earthquake After Action Report 
and Lessons Learned (AAR/LL)” (Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.  8 September 
2010). 
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In 2004, Dr. Peter Denning coined the term “Hastily Formed Networks” 
(HFN) and enlisted Brian Steckler to establish a lab at the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS).47 The HFN concept enables a small team of communications 
experts with an ICT capability to provide an operations command and control 
center in support of global DR efforts.48 The NPS HFN team is a two to seven 
person team, capable of rapidly deploying a mobile command and control 
communications capability in support of minimal notice Humanitarian Assistance 
and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) missions. To date, the NPS HFN team has 
supported four major international DR deployments and participated in numerous 
international military and state sponsored training exercises. Through 
deployments and training exercises, the NPS HFN team constantly transforms its 
deployment packages to resolve issues discovered.  
B. HASTILY FORMED NETWORKS DEPLOYMENT REVIEW 
1. Southeast Asia Tsunami Deployment 
The first official test of the HFN concept occurred during the deployment to 
Southeast Asia.49 On December 26, 2004, as a result of a massive 9.0-9.3 
earthquake in Indonesia, tsunamis were generated, affecting eleven countries.50 
As a relatively newly formed DR mission concept, the NPS HFN team was 
tasked to establish two broadband networks. In its early phases, HFN did not 
possess the scalability or capacity required to support the event without 
commercial partner assistance.51 In order to address the shortcomings, ad-hoc 
partnerships were formed to provide support, technical expertise, and additional 
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equipment. Partnerships were formed with Redline Communications (802.16 
WiMAX), Rajant Corporation (802.11 Wi-Fi), and Cisco Corporation (Network 
Router, VoIP).52 
On January 4, 2004, Brian Steckler, the HFN communications expert, and 
his team arrived in Bangkok, Thailand..53 The first steps of the mission required 
coordinating local government and the Royal Thai Armed Forces support. On 
January 8, 2005, the team began to establish its first hasty network connection at 
the Yang Yao Grave Registration Center and Morgue.54 The team’s secondary 
site was located at the nearby Bang Muang indigenously displaced persons (IDP) 
camp. Each site established a meshed 802.11 Wi-Fi cloud and was bridged 
using Redline 802.16 WiMAX technology.55 By harnessing the power of WiMAX 
and meshed Wi-Fi, each site’s responders were able to connect to the Internet 
and collaborate with other DR teams. The HFN implementation allowed for 4,000 
survivors and 1,000 relief support personnel to communicate with colleagues, 
friends, and family members using the Internet connection at each site.56 
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Figure 3.   NPS HFN Team’s Southeast Asia Network Diagram.57 
Many issues surfaced during the first real world implementation of the 
NPS HFN team. Some of the significant issues identified from the deployment 
were as follows: 
 Functionality and durability issues  
 Cost of maintaining network equipment  
 HFN Fly Away Kit (FLAK) standard was not established or defined  
                                            
57. Brian Steckler, “Hastily Formed Networks: A report on Naval Postgraduate School 
Response to the 2004 Southeast Asia Tsunami” (Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.  25 
July 2005). 
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The functionality and durability of ICT equipment was a pervasive issue.58  
The Breadcrumb devices continuously failed during the deployment and required 
the procurement of replacement network components.59 Rajant Breadcrumb 
devices transform disparate wireless access points into a fully meshed Wi-Fi 
network.60 A meshed network allows mobile users to seamlessly shift to the 
nearest access point.61 
The cost of maintaining the equipment and providing service for the 
network was significant. BGAN is expensive and will not support many users 
concurrently.62 Very small aperture terminal (Vsat) will support more users 
sufficiently; however, setup and operation requires specific technical expertise 
and can be significantly more expensive depending on the service plan.63 
There is no existing definition of what needs to be in the FLAK.64  
Equipment requirements for each deployment differ. Steadily changing 
requirements complicate defining capabilities needed to support all deployment 
scenarios.  
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2. Hurricane Katrina Deployment 
On September 6, 2005, the NPS HFN team deployed to Hancock Medical 
Center in Bay Saint Louis, Mississippi, in support of U.S. DOD DR efforts for 
Hurricane Katrina.65  
Because Katrina occurred in the United States, many technology 
companies saw the disaster as an opportunity to sell their products and services. 
As such, there was a constant flood of companies offering their services directly 
to the NPS team leadership. These companies actually caused problems with the 
participation of the NPS HFN team in the mission. When Brian Steckler arrived 
with his HFN team, the incident commander of Hancock County Emergency 
Operations Center turned the U.S. Navy sponsored HFN team away, assuming 
they were another vendor trying to sell their products and services. Since HFN 
was a new concept, different levels of incident command denied the NPS HFN 
team’s offer to provide support. Due to the additional confusion from information 
technology companies, the incident commander did not understand the role of 
the NPS HFN team and their capabilities for the DR mission set.66 However, due 
to Mr. Steckler’s diligence and patience, the NPS HFN team finally participated.  
HFN’s layout for this deployment consisted of a wide area network 
connection and a local area connection. Satellite communications using a VSAT 
terminal established the connection to the Internet. The use of Wi-Fi (802.11) 
access points, WiMAX (802.16) bridge, and mobile command vehicles enabled 
4C for the mission.67 By increasing the capabilities of HFN in this deployment, 
the HFN team was able to concurrently push out services to multiple areas. 
Improving HFN’s FLAK prior to deployment enabled critical 4C participation for 
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key first responders and provided a way for the victims to reestablish contact with 
family members.   
The impact of Katrina on coastal Mississippi has been described as 
“staggering” with many communities and towns destroyed in a single night.68 
This massive storm spawned 11 tornados in Mississippi with hurricane winds 
smashing the coast for seventeen hours.69 Over one million people were affected 
in rural areas and had limited means for assistance.70 This area had far less 
visibility than New Orleans, but the victims were in equally dire situations with 
fewer law enforcement, medical and relief resources, and transportation routes to 
support these populations. 
The HFN deployment connected high critical nodes that had a direct 
impact on human security in the areas affected most by this disaster (see Figure 
4). This deployment connected the police and law enforcement in the hardest hit 
areas in Bay St. Louis and Waveland, Mississippi, as well as the relief distribution 
center and the Hancock Medical Center. In these ways, the deployments in 
Thailand and Mississippi were highly similar—they occurred in rural areas, with 
serious impact, limited infrastructure, and a high population of victims in 
desperate situations. 
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Figure 4.  NPS HFN Team’s Katrina Network Infrastructure.71             
Due to the limited timeline between Thailand and Katrina missions  
(7 months), only some of the issues previously discovered were addressed. 
During the Katrina deployment, the team experienced some of the same 
challenges they did in Thailand. The primary issue that resurfaced during this 
deployment was equipment interoperability and durability issues. In addition, the 
changes and upgrades to the FLAKs brought issues to the surface. 
The significant issues identified during the Katrina were as follows: 
 Equipment durability, accountability, and interoperability issues 
 Access to satellite communications was limited 
 Network security policies were not in place 
 Power generation issues 
 
                                            




Donated equipment experienced functionality and durability issues.72 
Some of the equipment did not perform for the duration of the mission. After the 
replacements arrived, there was no designated method for maintaining 
accountability of the network equipment.73 Finally, some of the equipment 
donated suffered from significant interoperability issues when used in concert 
with products from other vendors.74 
Throughout the Katrina deployment, access to government and 
commercial satellites was limited. Because of the limited access to the satellite 
connection points and shared frequency bands, saturation of bandwidth was a 
constant problem.75 The absence of quality control mechanisms resulted in 
communications degradation during peak times.76  
Another significant issue with the NPS HFN team was the lack of a multi-
layered network security plan. Improper security procedures and lack of policies 
negated the ability of the NPS HFN team to manage the users that were 
connected. The lack of intrusion detection and prevention solutions denied the 
ability to monitor traffic on HFN.77  
During the deployment, the NPS HFN team was vulnerable to cyber-attack   
because the team did not implement and enforce a multi-layered security 
solution. The NPS HFN team experienced an unexplained degradation of 
service. Due to the partner relations, Mr. Steckler was able to identify that the 
service degradation was coming from an IP range outside of the internal network. 
A few days prior to being relieved, an access list solution provided the means to 
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thwart further DOS attacks.78 Due to the lack of a multi-layered security solution, 
the NPS HFN experienced a suspected denial of service (DOS) attack.79 
During natural disasters, the power grid usually fails in affected areas.80 It 
is problematic to transport power generation equipment and the supporting 
materials required to operate them to the disaster area.81 There is an immediate 
need for self-sustaining power generation capabilities.82 
3. Haiti Earthquake Deployment 
On January 12, 2010, a 7.3 magnitude earthquake caused catastrophic 
damage to the country of Haiti, on the island of Hispaniola (Shared with the 
Dominican Republic).83 The devastation that occurred resulted in over 220,000 
deaths.84 The damage was so extensive that it incapacitated a significant amount 
of the island’s disaster response capability and critical infrastructure. Larry 
Wentz, an observer for the National Defense University, published a trip report 
detailing his observation of the ICT situation during the mission. In his report, 
Wentz indicated that over 40 percent of the government buildings experienced 
catastrophic damage.85 He also mentioned that the earthquake destroyed the UN 
headquarters and the UN command and communication facilities, killing 
approximately 150 peacekeeping mission members of the United Nations.86 
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Despite the significant damages, some of the cellular and network infrastructure 
remained intact.87 
On January 18, 2010, the NPS HFN team deployed in support of DR 
operations in Haiti.88 The team provided advice and employed their ICT platform 
in support of the relief effort.89 The initial assignment of the team provided 
additional ICT capability for the United States Naval Ship (USNS) Comfort 
mission.9091 The team was able to provide network connectivity to the locations 
in Figure 6 using its Redline WiMAX links and Wi-Fi Mesh capability. A few 
weeks later, the NPS HFN team provided support for Joint Task Force (JTF) 
Haiti. The new mission of the team provided communications for a variety of 
early responders including NGOs, UN personnel, U.S. government, and military 
entities.92 The NPS HFN team’s mission ended approximately thirty days after 
their initial deployment. 
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Figure 5.  NPS HFN Team’s Haiti Network Infrastructure.93 
For the Haiti mission, the HFN team was able to address issues presented 
in previous AARs. With some help from NPS students, the HFN team developed 
an improved technical solution for the FLAKs.94 The HFN contribution to the Haiti 
DR mission and international participation resulted in a slightly larger scale relief 
effort. With a much larger relief effort came a multitude of different international 
bodies and NGOs. The impact of more organized, international DR resulted in a 
completely different set of issues. The significant lessons learned from this event 
are as follows:  
 Information overload  
 Bandwidth over-utilization and frequency management issues  
 International distrust and collaboration issues 
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Due to the losses sustained directly to its facilities and workforce, the UN 
did not have the capability to lead disaster relief efforts.95 The lack of a 
contingency disaster mission command and control element caused significant 
confusion and fostered a feeling of anarchy.  
The lack of command and control (C2) empowered individual mission 
teams, using disparate collaboration solutions, to assume C2 of the mission in 
their respective areas. The use of disparate collaboration solutions created 
additional confusion and increased anarchy within the system.96 Based on 
Wentz’s report, there seemed to be a distinct feeling of information overload due 
to the using disparate collaboration solutions.  
Throughout the deployment, the U.S. Navy had the capability to provide a 
shared common operational picture (COP). Compartmentalization practices, 
complex interfaces, large bandwidth requirements, lack of vender-to-vendor data 
normalization, and social complexity rendered international access to the U.S. 
Navy COP unattainable. As such, the notion of a unified front for the DR was not 
possible during the initial phases of the mission.97 
The absence of frequency management during the mission affected 
communications between participating teams.98 The extraordinary quantity of 
satellite phones, BGANs, and VSAT terminals in close proximity created serious 
bandwidth and communications interference issues.99 The lack of a coordinated 
frequency management plan resulted saturated bandwidth and degraded service 
capabilities.100 Social media and interfaces were great assets, but the mission 
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teams lacked the capability to fully analyze and mine the data.101 Twitter, 
Facebook, Skype, and other social media tools and applications facilitated an 
unprecedented amount of information flow. The social media interfaces proved 
the most flexible and useful information tools for the victims due to flexibility, user 
familiarity, and ease of use.102  
The use of Short Message Service (SMS)103 numbers to locate people 
trapped inside buildings was an irreplaceable asset to search and rescue and 
resulted in numerous life-saving rescues.104  The SMS capability is heavily reliant 
on the availability of existing critical communications infrastructure, which in 
some cases is not available in the aftermath of a disaster. Fortunately, during the 
Haiti relief effort there were “pockets” of cellular coverage in the immediate 
aftermath of the earthquake, thus enabling some critical life-saving SMS 
traffic.105 
4. Typhoon Haiyan Deployment 
On November 8, 2013, Super Typhoon Haiyan made landfall in the 
Philippines.106 Super Typhoon Haiyan was the strongest tropical cyclone to hit 
land in history, with sustained winds of over 195 miles per hour.107 As of 
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November 22, 2013, the storm claimed the lives of over 5,000 people, was 
responsible for over 24,000 injuries, and displaced millions of Filipinos. 
The NPS HFN team deployed once again to provide communications 
infrastructure for disaster relief operations. For the Typhoon Haiyan relief effort, 
the NPS HFN team deployed to Tacloban, Philippines. The NPS HFN team 
served as ICT advisors to the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Brigade by conducting 
Rapid Information and Communication Technology Assessment Team 
(RTAT).108  During this deployment, significant capability improvements in social 
media assessment, reporting procedures, and situational awareness solutions 




Figure 6.  NPS HFN Team’s ICT Training During Typhoon Haiyan Mission.109  
Despite the added capabilities and functionality, the operation still suffered 
from technology and policy-based communications shortfalls.  
                                            
108. Waddell, Joshua and Brian Steckler. “Marine C2 in support of HA/DR: Observations and 
Critical Assessments Following Super-Typhoon Haiyan.” 19th International Command and 
Control Research and Technology Symposium, 2013, 
http://dodccrp.org/events/19th_iccrts_2014/track_chair/papers/120.pdf. 
109. Brian Steckler, “HFN Support Briefing on Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda” (Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. January 2014).  
 31
The initial procedures for RTAT reporting were manual and the capability 
suffered from severe compartmentalization. When filling in the information for the 
RTAT Emergency Operations (EMOPS) report, users were required to assess 
seven primary communications infrastructure criteria. The seven communications 
criteria are electricity, land lines/fiber, cellular, satellite, Wi-Fi (voice and data), 
broadcasting (TV/radio), and radio (tactical and commercial bands). By restricting 
participation to only authorized personnel, the effectiveness of the reporting 
procedure was limited. Enabling trusted members of the local government would 
have facilitated faster damage assessments.  
The lack of an automated solution for RTAT reporting resulted in manual 
submission of reports. Major Travis Beason, a 2014 NPS graduate, worked with 
Lighthouse software to develop an android mobile application to streamline the 
RTAT reporting process.110 Appendix B provides additional details on the RTAT 
project. 
 
Figure 7.  Lighthouse RTAT Application and PDC EMOPS Integration.111 
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COP information overflow is still a challenge. Pacific Disaster Center 
Emergency Operations Center (PDC EMOPS) provides a free a web based 
secure map interface (DisasterAware) for sharing situational information.112 
Figure 7 illustrates the integration of the Lighthouse application into the map 
interface of PDC EMOPS DisasterAware. This tool facilitated RTAT report 
information sharing in a map-based interface during the Hayian DR mission.113 
Although PDC EMOPS DisasterAware web interface has the capability to provide 
COP, no legislation appointed DisasterAware as the designated COP provider. 
This was similar to previous deployments, in which multiple organizations 
provided their own collaborative solutions.  
The relief effort continued to suffer from bandwidth degradation due to 
oversaturation of satellite communication links. As in the Haiti, the international 
DR mission teams each provided ICTs, which resulted in additional congestion 
within the network. Network security was still a challenge for the NPS HFN team 
and others setting up HFNs. In 2004, the Institute of Electrical and Electronic 
Engineers (IEEE), a body of standards for communications, deemed the WEP 
standard obsolete and replaced the standard with Wi-Fi Protected Access 
(WPA).114115 At the time of the deployment, the NPS provided BGANs only 
supported the outdated and overly unsecured Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) 
standard for encrypting wireless data and traffic.116  
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In principle to use encryption on a network, all devices must use the same 
encryption standard. Since the team’s Hughes 9201 BGAN only supported WEP 
encryption standard, to interoperate with the other wireless access points, the 
legacy standard was required. Use of obsolete encryption standards allows the 
traffic to be accessible to potential adversaries.  
Adding to the use of obsolete standards, the NPS HFN team did not have 
a plan to implement a layered security plan for its network. There was no way to 
monitor the network or prevent outside intrusions. In addition, system security, 
network securities, and acceptable use policies were undefined or did not exist. 
The lack of a multi-layered security solution for the NPS HFN team left the 
network in the same security posture as it was in 2004. Without the capability to 
monitor traffic, identification of an attack was not possible. 
Using social media, such as Twitter and Facebook, has proven to be a 
valuable means of DR communication.117 Whether we continue to use the 
available commercial social media tools or develop a DR specific social media 
tool, we have yet to fully address the risks, benefits, and capabilities of this 
venue.   
C. SOLUTIONS SUMMARY 
This chapter provided examples of restructuring, collaborative, and ICT 
solutions implemented to improve disaster relief efforts. These solutions help to 
reduce the anarchy within the DR system. Compartmentalization, social 
complexity, and the lack of international trust form barriers to open 
communication. These barriers work in concert with each other to increase the 
anarchy within the DR system. 
In addition, it highlighted issues experienced by the NPS HFN team during 
disaster relief deployments. The issues identified during the NPS HFN team’s 
deployments are as follows: 
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 Functionality and durability issues  
 Cost of maintaining network equipment  
 HFN fly away kit (FLAK) standard was not established or defined 
 Equipment durability, accountability, and interoperability issues 
 Access to satellite communications was limited 
 Network security policies were not in place 
 Power generation issues 
 Information overload  
 Bandwidth over-utilization and frequency management issues  
 International distrust and collaboration issues 
 Lack of automated reporting (manual RTAT reports) 
 Lack of social media integration and usage 
Regardless of the solution category, all items presented applied solutions 
to symptoms rather than addressing the system-level problem. Before providing 
a solution to this problem, planners must explore the context of the system-level 




 WICKED PROBLEMS AND SYSTEMS THINKING III.
A. DISASTER RELIEF AS A WICKED PROBLEM 
From global warming to refuse disposal, the international community is 
flooded with complex problems that exhibit wicked characteristics.118 Rittel and 
Webber define a wicked problem as “complex, ill-defined, constantly changing, 
involve lots of stakeholders with conflicting views, and cannot be solved using 
linear ‘system’ processes.”119  
A more recent definition of a wicked problem comes from the book Wicked 
Problems: Problems Worth Solving, from the Austin Center for Design (Ac4d). 
Ac4d defines a wicked problem as “a social or cultural problem that is difficult or 
impossible to solve for as many as four reasons: incomplete or contradictory 
knowledge, the number of people and opinions involved, the large economic 
burden, and the interconnected nature of these problems with other 
problems.”120 
Another advocate of Horst Rittel’s work on wicked problems was Dr. Jeff 
Conklin. Dr. Conklin’s book on dialog mapping for wicked problems proposed a 
framework for identifying wicked problem characteristics. Dr. Conklin 
summarized Horst Rittel’s description of wicked problem characteristics as the 
following:  
 “You don’t understand the problem until you have developed a 
solution.  
 Wicked problems have no stopping rule.  
 Solutions to wicked problems are not right or wrong.  
 Every wicked problem is essentially unique and novel. 
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 Every solution to a wicked problem is a one shot operation. 
 Wicked problems have no given alternative solutions.”121122 
It is difficult to identify whether a problem exhibits wicked characteristics 
without understanding the problem context or problem space. Dr. Conklin 
introduced dialog mapping as a process to understand context and identify 
complex problems that possess wicked characteristics.123 The dialog mapping 
process starts with a question or problem statement, and explores all possible 
ideas and solutions. When combined with Dr. Conklin’s dialog mapping process, 
Rittel’s definition allows planners to determine if the problem exhibits 
characteristics of wickedness.  
The following DR question proposes a potential solution for evaluation 
against Rittel’s definition and Dr. Conklin’s process, determining if wicked 
problem characteristics are present in the system: Which country or organization 
should be ultimately responsible for all global disasters and humanitarian crisis 
response?  
1. “You Don’t Understand a Problem Until You Have a 
Solution”124 
Using Conklin’s process, as ideas evolve from the original problem 
question additional supporting questions arise. These ideas spawn additional 
questions, indicated by the icon’s number in Figure 8. Many times the additional 
questions become so complex that they require their own dialog map. The 
number of additional dialog maps created quickly becomes unruly. For the 
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proposed question, any idea, results in an inconceivable number of additional 
problems that require consideration.125 
 
Figure 8.  Dialog Map of the Proposed Question.  
To understand the complexity in Figure 8, consider that there are currently 
192 countries and over a thousand DR organizations that have a stake in the 
question. Each countries’ and organizations’ values, morals, desires, and 
experiences differ. These differences result in organizations providing different 
solutions, as it is from their own perspectives. The exploration of ideas for solving 
this problem identifies additional complexities within the problem space. 
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Furthermore, the complexities identified render the selection of a viable solution 
improbable. 
2. “Wicked Problems Have No Stopping Rule”126 
By looking at Figure 2 and the previous characteristic, it is difficult to 
identify a distinct stopping point. Shareholders play a big role in organizational 
decisions, especially in situations such as the proposed question. To appoint an 
authoritative organization, all of the stakeholders must agree and accept the 
group’s decision. Due to the quantity of stakeholders, attaining a unanimous 
solution is unlikely. Without unanimous approval, an authoritative figure will not 
solve the problem. If an authoritative figure is appointed, the social complexity of 
the stakeholders will act as barriers to conformity. Because of this, there are no 
methods or indicators to determine when the solution presented solves the 
problem. 
3. “Solutions to Wicked Problems Are Not Right or Wrong”127 
According to Dr. Conklin, problems are contextual and cannot be identified 
using simple or complex mathematical equations.128 Nominating a country or 
organization as the responsible entity for DR will differ for each country or 
organization due to many different factors: bureaucratic procedures, legal 
constraints on scope or authority, or local practice, for example. Stakeholders 
prefer their own nominations, while strongly expressing reservations against 
other potential nominees. There is no right or wrong solution; there are only 
differences in personal preferences and individual biases. 
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4. “Every Wicked Problem is Essentially Unique and Novel”129 
Disasters are complex events. Even a disaster that is predictable, such as 
the typhoons in the Philippines, will impact different stakeholders, different 
systems, and have different outcomes. During the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the 
local government and the United Nations, infrastructure and personnel were 
destroyed or killed as a result. This situation was unique because the command 
structure for the response was completely obliterated. Almost every disaster on 
record presents its own unique challenges physically, socially, and logistically. 
5. “Every Solution to a Wicked Problem is a One-Shot 
Operation”130 
In a wicked problem, there is no way to test a solution because every 
solution can have lasting second-order effects, which can create additional 
problems.131 In July 2004, the state of Louisiana hosted a disaster preparedness 
exercise known as Hurricane Pam.132 Despite the planning and coordination 
efforts during the exercise, things did not go as planned during the response to 
Katrina.133 The plans and processes produced from Hurricane Pam exercise can 
serve as a baseline for future events. However, exercises assume specific 
conditions, which may or may not support the reality during actual relief efforts. 
The expectation that disasters and the relief effort will occur according to plan is 
unrealistic. As such, every disaster is a one shot operation. 
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6. “Wicked Problems Have No Given Alternative Solutions”134 
After action reports (AARs), from DR events over the last decade 
exemplify that the lack of centralized responsibility for DR operations directly 
contributes to the anarchy within the system. There are no given alternative 
solutions to appointing a responsible entity for DR missions. The question 
proposed is improperly framed and does not allow for the exploration of alternate 
solutions.135 The question proposed addresses one of the symptoms of a 
system-level problem within the DR system.  
Based on the above comparison, there should be no doubt that disaster 
relief is a wicked problem. In addition to being a wicked problem, the complexity 
of DR and its international impact warrants classification as a system. Rather 
than classifying DR as a singular system, other systems such as governments, 
militaries, nongovernmental organizations, and commercial organizations 
working in concert towards a common goal constitute a system of systems. As 
such, it would be premature to propose a solution without an understanding of 
the interdependencies of the system. To further evaluate the interdependencies 
in the DR system, planners must identify all relational dependencies within the 
DR system. 
B. DISASTER RELIEF AS A SYSTEM 
According to Dr. Derek Anthony Cabrera, systems concepts date back 
2600 years, to Lao Tzu’s explanation of yin and yang.136 Systems Thinking is not 
an equation to solving wicked problems; it is a conceptual framework accessed 
to understand the system in its related components.137 The Systems Thinking 
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process defines and explores the entire problem space, properly frames the 
problem within the problem space, and enables planners to deal with wicked 
problems. Properly framing the problem within the problem space enables 
identification of the system-level problem. With the system-level problem 
identified, stakeholders can develop solutions that can have an impact on the 
entire system. Many of the symptoms identified will be resolved through 
implementing the system-level solution.  
A system is a group of independent items or objects working in concert 
towards a common goal or performing individual actions to provide a singular 
function.138 The Systems Thinking process relies on the following principles: 
 Analyzing the target problem using a big picture perspective139  
 Identifying and understanding the balancing mechanisms within the 
system140 
 Accounting for the complexities of dynamic, interdependent 
systems141 
 Understanding the nature and differences between measurable and 
non-measurable entities within the system142 
 Account for the socially complex nature of human behavior and 
identifying its effect on the system143  
C. A SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE FOR DISASTER RELIEF 
The first step of a Systems Thinking process is to define the problem 
using a succinct narrative.144 The narrative provides a short, succinct definition of 
the problem space.  
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1. Narrative 
The anarchy created in the aftermath of a natural disaster is 
uncompromising. The lack of international legislation and appointed authority 
results in increasing the level of anarchy associated with DR.145 DR mission 
teams provide assistance and resources for disaster relief to local first 
responders, governments, and victims.146 After DR mission teams arrive, the 
social complexity of the mission increases, reducing the desire and capability of 
the mission teams to participate in open 4C. This lack of international 
participation in open 4C results in a reduction of the overall quality of the 
response. A reduction in the overall response quality incites additional stress, 
thus resulting in a longer duration to the relief mission.   
2. Identification of Stakeholders 
The identification of stakeholders helps the planner conceptualize the 
social implications within a group. The scope of social impact is directly 
proportional to stakeholder diversity. An understanding of the diversity and social 
complexity helps to better identify the problem area. The primary stakeholders for 
DR are foreign countries, the UN, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), local 
governments, and the victims. 
D. VARIABLE IDENTIFICATION  
The second step in the Systems Thinking process is to identify and name 
the primary measurable and non-measurable variables.147 The book Systems 
Thinking Basics: From Concepts to Causal Loops defines variables as 
components of the problem that can vary over time. Table 1 illustrates the 
redefined variables for the disaster relief system. The steps for identification of 
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variables are identification, consolidate, eliminate, redefine, and verify.148 
Appendix A contains all steps in the Systems Thinking process.    
Table 1.   The Redefined Variables for Disaster Relief.  
Variables Redefining Variables 
Scope of the Disaster The degree of damage and level of impact that the 
physical and emotional damage have on the victims 
of the disaster. The actions of all stakeholders and 
victims affect the speed and efficiency of recovery 
operations.  
Number of DR Mission 
Teams 
Contingent upon severity of incident. The number of 
DR mission teams and capability required facilitating 
an efficient and effective relief. 
Response Quality The overall quality of service provided by the mission 
teams combined.    
Anarchy Ultimate state of disorder, uncertainty, instability, 
insecurity, and identification of leadership. 
Social Complexity Humans tend to react in a certain manner based on 
their individual experiences, beliefs, morals, and 
values. These reactions are also based upon the 
norms, values, and belief systems of their country, 
state, city, and origin.  
Stress Level of stress associated with DR. This includes all 
stakeholders. 
 
E. PROPERLY DEPICT THE PROBLEM SPACE 
The next step in the Systems Thinking process is to properly depict the 
problem space. In order to properly depict the problem space, three products 
must be generated and analyzed. These products are a timeline, a behavior over 
time (BoT) chart, and the initial causal loop diagram (CLD).149 The results from 
AARs, academic research, narratives, and redefined variables facilitate creation 
of these products.  
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1. Timeline Generation 
The timeline bridges the gap between the narrative, the variables, and the 
products created later in the process.150 The timeline encourages the planner to 
define the system processes. The processes discovered form a graphical 
depiction of DR efforts. An investigation into deployments and AARs indicate that 
the measurable baseline for a DR mission set is between zero and thirty days.  
Prior to a disaster, some organizations participate in 4C activities with 
designated trusted parties. Most of the 4C activities are in the form of standard 
operating procedure development, disaster response planning, and pre-disaster 
exercises.151 In some cases, there are no pre-disaster 4C interactions between 
stakeholders. The best scenario is to assume little to no international 4C has 
taken place prior to a DR event. Based on this assessment, the timeline covers 
the first thirty-one days of the event. Figure 9 illustrates an example timeline for 
DR mission set. 
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Figure 9.  Timeline for Disaster Relief Mission Set.152 
2. Behavior Over Time Chart  
The behavior over time (BoT) chart provides the opportunity to examine 
each of the variables within the problem space and identify patterns.153 Once 
patterns are established, the assessment of the BoT enables the creation of the 
initial causal loop diagram (CLD).154 Figure 10 depicts the behavior over time 
(BoT) chart. 
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Figure 10.  Disaster Relief Variable Relationship over Time.155 
The initial assessment of Figure 10 shows that the variables of the number 
of DR mission teams, social complexity, and response quality exhibit an 
opposing relationship with the scope of disaster, stress, and anarchy. It appears 
that as the number of DR mission teams increase, response quality increases but 
not at the same rate as expected. By increasing the number of DR mission 
teams, anarchy and social complexity increase. Increases in anarchy and social 
complexity reduce response quality. Adding to the anarchy within the system, the 
increase of social complexity reduces the desire of the teams to participate in 
open 4C activities. 
The final assessment of Figure 10 warrants a discussion of the impact of 
the variables on the system as a whole. Because of system interdependencies, 
applying a solution to one variable may not produce a significant change at the 
system level. However, if a proposed solution influences more than one variable 
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in the system, the outcome could potentially solve the problem. For instance, if 
the proposed solution reduces social complexity and anarchy within the system, 
the scope of the disaster and its duration could significantly reduce.  
3. Initial Causal Loop Diagram  
The causal loop diagram (CLD) graphically illustrates the problem area.156 
The CLD also defines the relationships between the variables. Figure 11 depicts 
the initial DR CLD. 
 
Figure 11.  The Initial Disaster Relief Causal Loop Diagram.157 
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a. Initial Disaster Relief Causal Loop Diagram Flow 
The flow of the diagram moves in a clockwise motion. The diagram flow 
reads as follows:  
1. A disaster occurs resulting in catastrophic damage to the affected 
area. The damage to the affected area determines the initial scope 
of the disaster. 
2. As the initial scope of the disaster increases, the number of DR 
mission teams required increases. 
3. As the number of DR mission teams required increases, the level of 
social complexity increases.   
4. As the level of social complexity increases, level of information 
anarchy increases.   
5. As the level of information anarchy increases, the level of response 
quality decreases. 
6. As the level of response quality decreases, the level of overall 
stress increases.                    
7. As the level of overall stress increases, the scope of the disaster 
increases.  
8. As the scope of the disaster increases, the number of DR mission 
teams required increases. 
9. As the number of DR mission teams required increases, the level of 
social complexity increases. 
10. As the level of social complexity increases, the level of anarchy 
increases. 
The relationships between each of the variables within the CLD determine 
the system model assigned to the causal loop and the problem space.158 The 
CLD system model is one of the best indicators of determining when a system-
level problem exists. In some cases, assessing the CLD will change the planner’s 
perception of the problem.   
 Examining the system model facilitates a more thorough understanding of 
the entire system. This enables the planner to properly frame the problem 
statement within the problem space.159 
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The system model can be determined by counting the number of opposite 
relationships in the CLD.160 An even number of opposite relationships identify the 
loop as reinforcing, and an odd number of opposite relationships indicate a 
balancing loop.161 Reinforcing loops represent systems that remain in a vicious, 
unrelenting cycle;162 whereas, balancing loops inject measures to tame vicious 
uncompromising system cycles.163  
An assessment of the CLD for DR represents a reinforcing loop and is 
destined to remain in an uncompromising cycle.164 The results of the CLD 
confirm that a system-level problem within DR exists. Reinforcing loops require a 
balancing mechanism to break the cycle. To apply a balancing mechanism, the 
planner must identify the system-level problem variable. The system-level 
problem variable will serve as the balancing solution injection point. 
b. Determining the System Level Problem Variable 
One way to determine the system-level problem variable is by identifying 
the negative variables of the system. These variables negatively impact the 
system and exhibit a distinct opposite relationship with their direct neighbors. 
Because system variables are interdependent, this process can indicate multiple 
system-level problem variables. The planner must establish a system for 
differentiating between potential system-level variables.  
One method to differentiate between system-level problem variables is to 
modify the level of the opposing variables and renegotiate the CLD. 
Renegotiating the CLD reveals the nature (positive or negative) of each variable. 
If reducing the variable helps to improve the system, then it is representative of a 
likely system-level problem variable. If reducing the variable has a negative effect 
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on the system, then it is not the system-level problem variable. The variable that 
imposes the greatest negative impact on the system is the system-level problem 
variable. 
Within the DR CLD, there are six variables. Three of the variables have 
opposing (O) relationships with their immediate neighbors. These variables are 
response quality, stress, and information anarchy.  
1. A reduction of response quality reflects negatively on the system. 
Response quality is not the system-level problem variable.  
2.  A reduction in system-level stress would have a positive effect on 
the system. An increase in system-level stress has a negative 
effect on the system. Stress is a candidate for the system-level 
problem variable. 
3. A reduction in information anarchy would have a positive effect on 
the system. An increase in information anarchy has a negative 
effect on the system. Information anarchy is also a candidate for 
the system-level problem variable.   
To distinguish the system-level problem variable from the remaining 
variables, a system impact assessment is required. If the stress within the 
system is reduced, the scope of the disaster is reduced, but not to such a point 
that it would take away from the physical attributes of the disaster. By the 
definition in Table 2, a reduction in anarchy would increase the order and 
organization for the DR mission. Furthermore, a reduction of information anarchy 
increases the response quality and reduces the stress that occurs because of the 
catastrophe. When actors have equal access to critical information and share 
information appropriately, this leads to better coordination, cooperation, and 
collaboration, thus reducing the anarchic aspects of the on-the-ground response 
among parties with similar goals and objectives. 
4. Properly Frame the Problem 
With the system-level problem variable identified, the planner can develop 
a problem statement that accurately reflects the problem space. The system-
level problem statement is as follows:  
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The lack of information sharing, stress, and social complexity present 
within the DR system breed chaos and severely reduce the mission teams’ ability 
to effectively communicate, coordinate, cooperate, and collaborate (4C). This 
leads to anarchic tendencies and confusion among DR participants. Whatever 
central or leading authority may exist, this confusion and lack of communication 
are likely to further undermine it. Reduced 4C during DR missions diminishes the 
quality of the relief, increases the duration of the relief effort, and presents an 
unsynchronized, disjointed front. The lack of a unified front for DR missions 
increases the disjointedness and confusion in response, leading to anarchic 
situations that can result in preventable post-disaster damage, injuries, and loss 
of life.    
5. Injection Point and Validation 
Injection points are created to show a vector within a systems model 
where a balancing solution could break the vicious cycle.165 From a DR 
perspective, it would be difficult to implement a solution directly to negative 
system-level variables. A significant increase in response quality would be 
difficult without added capabilities from DR mission teams.  
Some of the previously discussed solutions focus on establishing a 
network connection to facilitate 4C activities. For the DR system model, previous 
solution attributes reside within the variable number of mission teams. As such, 
the number of mission teams represents the preliminary injection point.   
ICT solutions provide responders with a means to participate in 4C. ICT 
solutions provide additional capability for their individual areas. If a 
communication strategy combines ICT capability with open 4C interface, the 
impact produced by the variable number of mission teams may potentially add a 
balancing structure to the existing reinforcing loop. As such, the number of 
mission teams represents a valid injection point into the system.  
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The next step identifies and defines the balancing loop variables.166 The 
author’s research shows that organizational restructuring, ICT solutions, and 
collaboration platforms introduce mechanisms to facilitate 4C and reduce 
anarchy within the DR system. A reduction in information anarchy may be 
possible if a solution was to incorporate organizational structure, a 
communication enabler, and an internationally accepted 4C interface. By 
definition, the communication, coordination, cooperation, and collaboration 
variables synchronize relief efforts and help to present a unified front for DR 
missions. Thus, the variables that make up 4C represent likely variables for a 
balancing function. Table 2 defines the balancing loop variables. 
Table 2.   The Balancing Loop Variables for Disaster Relief.  
Balancing Variables Definitions 
Communications The communications variable encompasses all 
forms of communication. This includes verbal, 
written, signaled, and electronic communication 
methods. 
Coordination The coordination variable encompasses, organizing 
efforts between disparate groups, in preparation for 
participation in an activity. Coordination works to 
prevent individual or group actions from interfering 
with the actions of other individuals and groups. 
Cooperation Cooperation encompasses coordination on a larger 
scale and occurs when organizations work together 
for a common beneficial outcome.    
Collaboration Collaboration encompasses the act of organizations 
working together and sharing information in order to 
generate a product or system. The product or 
system modifies, improves, or changes an existing 
system or process. Collaboration can also facilitate 
the creation of a new system.  
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With defined variables, the balancing loop is ready for insertion into the 
final CLD.167 Due to the changes in the DR CLD, it is necessary to reassess the 
flow and test the CLD diagram. Assessing the CLD flow, verifies whether the 
added variables maintain a balancing effect.168 Figure 12 illustrates the final DR 
CLD. 
F. FINAL DISASTER RELIEF CAUSAL LOOP DIAGRAM 
 
Figure 12.  Final Disaster Relief Causal Loop Diagram.169 
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The final CLD flow is as follows: 
1. A disaster occurs resulting in catastrophic damage to the affected 
area. The damage to the affected area determines the initial scope 
of the disaster. 
2. As the initial scope of the disaster increases, the number of DR 
mission teams required increases. 
3. As the number of DR mission teams required increases, the 
communication capability level increases.   
4. As the communication capability level increases, the level of 
coordination increases.  
5. As the level of coordination increases, the level of cooperation 
increases.  
6. As the level of cooperation increases, the level of collaboration 
increases. 
7. As the level of collaboration increases, the level of information 
anarchy deceases.   
8. As the level of information anarchy decreases, the level of 
response quality increases.   
9. As the level of response quality increases, overall stress 
decreases. 
10. As overall stress decreases, the scope of the disaster decreases.                     
11. As the scope of the disaster decreases, the number of DR mission 
teams required decreases.  
12. As the number of DR mission teams required decreases, the level 
of social complexity decreases.  
13. As the social complexity decreases, the level of general anarchy 
decreases. 
 
Individually, any of the 4C variables could maintain an opposing 
relationship with social complexity and anarchy. However, combining the 4C 
variables adds structure and organization to the system. Combining the variables 
could potentially facilitate establishing a unified front for DR missions. An 
internationally embraced communications strategy, combining a connection 
capability with an interface for 4C, could potentially decrease anarchy and tame 
the vicious cycle within the DR system.  
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 A COMMUNICATION STRATEGY FOR DISASTER RELIEF IV.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide design suggestions and concept 
prototypes that specifically address the issues within DR from a systems 
perspective. Previously implemented collaboration solutions have failed to obtain 
international acceptance because business models or implementation methods 
did not address social complexity challenges within the DR system. The ideas 
and concepts from previous solutions are decent; however, the traditional models 
of ownership, management, and administration do not fit into the DR system. 
Why do collaborative solution providers continuously embrace traditional 
(hierarchically-oriented) models of implementation, given the resistance of many 
critical actors?   
Instead of working together to develop a single communications strategy 
concept, vendors create competing solutions, further adding to information 
fragmentation. As an international body, DR responders and their respective 
vendors may need to reassess their priorities.  
As identified in Chapter III, DR is a wicked problem. No singular solution, 
developed independently, will solve a system-level wicked problem. An 
internationally accepted communications strategy can only provide some 
measure of reprieve to the system. The concepts in this chapter provide a 
foundation for addressing the problems within DR from a systems-level 
approach. These concepts represent a means to inspire the international DR 
community to begin the development of a common 4C interface. To overcome 
the anarchy and social complexity impact on DR missions, the international 
community should consider the design suggestions and prototype concepts in 
this chapter.  
A. TRUSTED ORGANIZATION FOR INTEGRATION MANAGEMENT 
As discussed, social complexity leads to a vicious cycle where actors do 
not communicate effectively, cannot get a full understanding of the situation, and 
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thus, they cannot coordinate or collaborate effectively.170 This means they are 
less likely to cooperate with one another, because cooperation involves exposing 
their operations to greater risks—risks of blame for failure and errors, risks of 
having their productivity and success attributed to others, and other problems.171 
Developing a concept that does not address social implications of the system 
would be counterproductive to effective 4C and would likely fail. 
DR stakeholders have their own agendas, biases, and social complexity 
issues. As such, designating an existing DR entity or 4C solution provider as 
manager and service provider for the integration interface may prove difficult. To 
alleviate preconceived biases and social issues between DR mission entities, the 
creation of a trusted third-party organization may present a viable alternative 
solution for inspiring open and transparent 4C for DR.  
In concert with the previous statement, a fundamental step for developing 
this communication strategy is appointing or establishing a trusted organization. 
The trusted organization would provide the following three functions:  
1) Integration application development and testing; 2) Interface development, 
management, and administration; and 3) Community development and 
international relations. In addition, the new organization can assist with partner-
to-partner negotiations. The new organization addresses some of the social 
issues within DR using modular measures.   
Modular measures for this strategy involve the development of custom 
packaged interfaces for individual DR stakeholder organizations. These interface 
modules create a stakeholder-specific private community for its organizations. 
Private community design enables regional governments and organizations to 
have their own personal space for 4C within their respective countries or 
organizations. Information, resident and shared within the private communities, is 
restricted to the community and specified community partners. The custom 
                                            
170. Rebecca Goolsby, telephone call with author, 5 March 2015. 
171. Ibid. 
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packaged interface design enables pre-disaster partnerships between 
stakeholders through custom memorandums of understanding (MOUs) and 
service level agreements (SLAs).   
MOUs establish the informal terms of understanding between two private 
communities. The SLA is a document created by the trusted third-party 
organization; it contains an overview and implementation specifications based on 
the MOU. A signed SLA allows a temporary merge of operational interfaces for 
the purposes of a single DR mission. This includes, but is not limited to, common 
interface tools, use of common DR information, and the creation of disaster 
response plans. 
B. COMMUNICATION STRATEGY CONCEPTS 
The DR communication strategy does not create new or novel 
technologies; rather, it is an integration of existing technology into a usable and 
functional solution. This approach uses ICT capability to provide a connection to 
an integration interface. The strategy creates or appoints a trusted organization 
to manage custom packaged interfaces. The custom packaged common 
interface is where the international community, local governments, NGOs, and 
commercial DR organizations can interact within their own organizational 
communities. Custom packaged interfaces also enable integration of existing DR 
tools and solutions such as Dropbox, Skype, APAN, Jabber, Inrelief, and 
DisasterAware.  
In the event of a disaster, the communities could come together to share a 
common interface through integration and data normalization. Community 
integration allows the local government to maintain command and control (C2) 
while seamlessly presenting a unified front for International DR missions. Figure 
13 presents the disaster relief conceptual model. Integration and data 
normalization occurs through application development. These applications 
provide translation services, so that common information converts appropriately 
into the private community interface format.  
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Figure 13.  Disaster Relief Conceptual Model. 
1. Providing a Connection 
Communication in austere environments, with limited resources, requires 
the responder to have all necessary elements on hand when responding to a 
disaster. The selection of an ideal ICT system is contingent on many different 
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factors, but the most pertinent are finding a highly deployable, inexpensive, and 
secure communication system with scalable levels of service. Highly deployable 
indicates that ICT systems must be capable of deploying to the disaster area on 
very short notice. Inexpensive and affordable are acceptable goals. However, 
cost is relative to required bandwidth and user support requirements. The 
package examples below have varying levels of cost, based on purpose and 
bandwidth requirements. Although availability and integrity are the focus, the 
focus does not dismiss the need for security. A communications strategy should 
show a balance between information sharing and security.172 The requirements 
for security increase in proportion to the size of the organization, functions, and 
ICT package chosen. 
Organizations and mission teams vary throughout the DR community. As 
these teams refine their roles and desired capabilities, bandwidth requirements 
vary. To ensure scalable levels of service, the easiest approach is to introduce 
packages for varying organizational needs. 
2. Information and Communications Technology Solution 
Concept 
This section explores the capabilities of three median-level packages. The 
following characteristics of the three packages are as follows: deployability, cost, 
and security. Figure 14 provides a conceptual diagram of the three package 
categories. 
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Figure 14.  ICT Package Options.173 
a. ICT Mobile  
ICT Mobile packages provide the least amount of bandwidth, are highly 
deployable, and are inexpensive. Their size and cost make them an ideal choice 
for contingency communications. If ICT Mobile is the desired solution, teams 
                                            
173. Folsom, Eric and Brooks King, ICT Packages Concept, HFN Class Project, June 2014.  
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should work with ICT providers to develop methods to encrypt data-in-transit and 
at rest.  
A median solution identified for ICT Mobile is using a Delorme inReach 
Explorer Extreme.174 The inReach has the capability to send text messages of up 
to 160 characters in each text. In the current configuration, the device sends a 
message to Delorme. If coordinated in advance, Delorme could forward all 
messages from specified devices to a designated phone number or individual. 
This allows for position reporting, status updates, and resource request.  
Use of this system would be perfect for prepositioning in places like 
hospitals, fire departments, and police stations in countries or areas that are 
prone to a disaster. There is also the potential to develop an application that 
allows the device to access metadata from a map source; this potentially 
facilitates access to a common operational picture and serves as a guide to 
obtaining the assistance required. 
The baseline package for Delorme inReach with unlimited text messaging 
is approximately $499.95 + shipping and $1200 per year for service.175 Delorme 
inReach uses the GPS frequency bands (L1 and L2). The use of GPS 
communications reduces the impact on L Band (BGAN) devices. GPS accesses 
a different frequency range and uses different satellites for communications.176 
Figure 15 is a picture of the Delorme inReach Explorer. 
 
                                            
174. Delorme, “Delorme inReach Explorer Extreme,” Delorme website, accessed 14 
December 2014, http://www.inreachdelorme.com/product-info/inreach-explorer-extreme-
communication-kit.php.   
175. Ibid.   
176. Lonnie Wilson, Ph.D., Naval Postgraduate School Professor, email message to author, 
12 December 2014. 
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Figure 15.  Delorme inReach Explorer Extreme.177 
b. ICT Lite 
ICT Lite packages deliver more bandwidth to the customer. The baseline 
package for ICT Lite consists of a Broadband Global Area Network (BGAN), an 
alternate power source, laptop computers, and mobile devices. This package 
allows for the implementation of an IEEE 802.11 wireless network and can 
concurrently support up to eleven users depending on their usage of the 
bandwidth. More than eleven users would require the purchase of a wireless 
router. BGAN is capable of speeds up to 490 Kbps.178  
                                            
177. Delorme, “Delorme inReach Explorer Extreme,” Delorme website, accessed 14 
December 2014, http://www.inreachdelorme.com/product-info/inreach-explorer-extreme-
communication-kit.php. 
178. Network Innovations, “BGAN or VSAT Comparing Technologies,” 26 April 2012. 
accessed 14 December 2014, http://www.networkinv.com/bgan-or-vsat-comparing-the-
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A BGAN system is still highly deployable. BGANs are airline transportable 
and are small enough to fit into carry-on bags. ICT Lite packages are much more 
expensive than ICT Mobile packages, but offer significantly more capability for 
DR mission teams. Most ICT Lite solutions come with embedded security 
features. DR mission teams should closely examine each providers BGAN 
solution to ensure that vendor default encryption and other security controls do 
not rely on obsolete security standards.  
A median package for ICT Lite could be a Hughes 9201 BGAN Satellite 
Terminal for approximately $3000.179 The annual service plan is based on price 
per megabyte. A median price range is 500 MB for approximately $3000 per 
year.180 The estimate for the entire package is roughly $5,500 for the equipment 
and 1 year of service. Then for continued service, it is $2,499 per year. Figure 16 
illustrates this package. 
                                            
179. Ground Control Global Communications, “Inmarsat BGAN pricing,” accessed 14 
December 2014, http://www.groundcontrol.com/Hughes_9201_BGAN.htm 
180. Ground Control Global Communications, “Inmarsat Service Plan pricing,” accessed 14 
December 2014, http://www.groundcontrol.com/BGAN_rate_plans.htm. 
 64
 
Figure 16.  Hughes 9201 Broadband Global Area Network (BGAN).181 
c. ICT Standard 
ICT Standard packages have the potential to deliver maximum capability 
to the mission team. These packages may consist of a very small aperture 
terminal (VSAT) and a pair of Redline 802.16 WiMAX antennas. ICT Standard 
solutions provide sufficient capability for larger organizations with greater than 
                                            




eleven concurrent users. HFN’s current ICT Standard implementation fits into ten 
airline transportable tough boxes, making them highly deployable. An ICT 
Standard package represents the most costly and scalable solution. The VSAT 
terminal can range from $20,000–$200,000 for the dish itself. In addition, the 
monthly service plan ranges from $3,000–$20,000 depending on the data rate 
and the organizational requirements. For extra add-on capabilities, such as 
ruggedized Redline (or similar) WiMAX antennas, Persistent Systems (or similar) 
Wave Relay Wi-Fi, and RoIP interfaces, the cost would increase substantially. 
Annual cost estimate would be $36,000–$240,000 depending on the service 
plan.  
As with ICT Lite, ICT Standard packages come with mechanisms to 
provide basic security. As bandwidth increases, the cost of service and the 
number of end devices increases. As end devices connect to the network, 
system and network vulnerabilities can increase exponentially. When possible, 
DR mission teams should ensure that end devices receive updates prior to 
responding to a disaster. Reducing existing vulnerabilities prior to a deployment 
can significantly reduce the chance of an adversary gaining unauthorized access. 
Figure 17 illustrates one of ViaSat’s very small aperture terminals. Figure 18 
displays a picture and some basic data on Redline’s 802.16 WiMAX antennas. 
Figure 19, highlights the key components in Persistent System’s WAVE Relay 













Figure 17.  Very Small Aperture Terminal (Vsat).182 
                                            





Figure 18.  Redline 802.16 WiMAX Line of Sight (LOS) Antenna.183 
                                            




Figure 19.  Persistent Systems WAVE Relay Wi-Fi and Point-to-Point (P2P) 
Network184 
3. Power Generation for Solutions 
Some ICT packages only work with the provider’s alternate power 
sources; whereas, other ICT packages require the consumers to procure their 
own alternate power source solutions.  
Due to natural occurrences, disasters can occur anywhere in the world, 
which makes it difficult to recommend a specific vendor for ICT alternate power 
generation capability. The massive numbers of ICT kits available with varying 
power requirements preclude specifying an ideal power solution. Alternate power 
generation requirements will vary depending on the size and functionality of the 
                                            
184. Persistent Systems, “Wave Relay Manual - WR-01,” ver. 1.1, issued 12 April 2012, 
accessed 14 December 2014. 
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mission team. The chart in Appendix D provides a comparison of alternate power 
generation technology.  
C. A 4C INTEGRATION INTERFACE 
APAN, Relief Web, and Inrelief all provide portals to assist in 4C planning 
and collaboration. Software solutions such as Jabber and Skype equip 
responders with the capability to coordinate on the ground via voice and chat. 
Organizations such as PDC EMOPS, ArcGis, Google, and OpenStreetmaps 
provide tools and capabilities to develop a common operational picture. There is 
currently no way to integrate these capabilities into a common interface and to 
allow maximum flexibility and user preference. Thus, these solutions are 
problematic. Based on Larry Wentz’s research185 and lessons learned, a solution 
that integrates existing technologies and 4C vendor solutions into a common DR 
mission interface could result in the desired system-level impact. The solution 
must provide coverage of the following issues and attributes:  
 Ownership, implementation, administration, and hosting 
 Cloud models of service and deployment 
 Application interface 
 Mobile application interface 
 Security implications of the models 
1. Ownership, Implementation, Administration, and Hosting 
Development of the trusted third-party organization is the key to solving 
the issue with deciding ownership, management, and administration. Due to 
potential social implications, a single government, military, or existing DR 
organization cannot assume responsibility for ownership, management, and 
administration of the integration interface concept. As mentioned in the example 
question in Chapter III, appointing an outside entity as C2 for DR missions could 
result in irreversible second and third order effects. 
                                            
185. Larry Wentz, “Haiti Information and Communications Observations: Trip report for Visit 
18 February to 1 March 2010,” Center for Technology and National Security (National Defense 
University, Washington, DC, 08 August 2010).    
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Another factor to consider is hosting for the interface. Since disasters can 
occur worldwide, hosting the interface only in the United States or in another 
single country would not be effective. To provide open and continuous access to 
the interface, it has to be hosted in a distributed manner. 
One possible solution is to use cloud-computing technology as a means to 
provide distributed access to the integration interface. The use of cloud 
technology allows the greatest flexibility by providing the essential characteristics 
of on-demand self-service, broad network access, resource pooling, rapid 
elasticity, and measured service.186  
On-demand self-service allows the consumer to adjust resource 
requirements as needed, without additional human interaction.187 Broad Network 
Access allows device agnostic connections to network assets and resources.188 
Resource Pooling provides a vast quantity of storage, processing, network 
bandwidth capability, and other resources for the consumer on-demand while 
maintaining ambiguity of where the resources are actually located.189 The Rapid 
Elasticity component allows high availability models to succeed through the 
automatic variability of resource requirements based on consumer resource 
needs.190 Finally, the Measured Service component ensures usage transparency 
through providing monitoring, controlling, and statistics to the consumer.191 The 
essential characteristics of a cloud-based solution have the potential to grant the 
consumer access to a wealth of on-demand resources.192  
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Computing, National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication (NIST SP 800–








Hosting cost is an additional consideration for moving services to the 
cloud. Building infrastructure to host an internationally distributed interface that 
uses a traditional data center model would require a significant amount of money 
to build. In addition, maintaining a large employee base for application 
development, information management, and information security on a distributed 
international scale is likely to be unattainable.  
 Traditional storage cost versus cloud-based storage cost is a key factor to 
consider. The cost of accessing cloud storage is much less than the cost of 
traditional hard drive cost. Table 3 provides a short comparison. 
Table 3.   Cloud Storage Versus Traditional.  














Amazon S3 Block Blobs 
Capacity 2 Terabytes 2 Terabytes 2 Terabytes 2 Terabytes 
$ per Unit $119.99 $99.99 N/A N/A 




$ per GB $17.08 $50 $0.01 – $0.03 $0.02 - $0.06
$ per year $0 $0 Usage Based Usage Based
 
 
When disasters occur and DR mission teams deploy, resource 
requirements increase significantly; they decrease as the teams complete their 
                                            
193. Tiger Direct, “Seagate Hard Drive Advertisement,” accessed 29 January 2015. 
http://www.tigerdirect.com/applications/SearchTools/item-
details.asp?EdpNo=9557692&CatId=4357. 
194. Tiger Direct, “Western Digital Hard Drive Advertisement,” accessed 29 January 2015, 
http://www.tigerdirect.com/applications/SearchTools/item-
details.asp?EdpNo=3580091&csid=_61. 
195. Amazon Web Service, “Storage Pricing,” AWS EC2, accessed 20 January 2015, 
http://aws.amazon.com/ec2/pricing/. 
196. Microsoft Azure, “Storage Pricing,” MS Azure, accessed 20 January 2015, 
http://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/pricing/details/storage/. 
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missions and return home. Private community models for the international DR 
community have an undefined requirement for computing resources.  
An enterprise system managed by an IT staff does not have the scalability 
that is present in a cloud-based deployment. In addition to scalability, the cost of 
maintaining staff to service an enterprise solution would be significant. Employing 
staff, leasing data centers, and paying the electric bill associated with operating 
the data center are factors that greatly outweigh the cost to procure cloud 
services.  
2. Cloud Models of Service and Deployment 
One of the key focuses for DR mission teams is allowing the local 
government to serve as primary command and control for the relief effort. Any 
technology solution for DR missions must consider ways to protect the integrity of 
that command structure. As such, the cloud service and deployment model 
design has to incorporate methods that facilitate a local government led effort.  
The service model selected should provide an interface for the DR 
customers. The cloud model of service for a DR system-level solution would 
need to support the development, testing, and implementation of applications 
that facilitate integration of existing 4C solutions.  
In accordance with the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) special publication, there are three types of service models and four types 
of deployment models for cloud based solutions. Tables 4 and 5 identify the 




Table 4.   Cloud Service Models.197 
Service Models Access Granted 
Software as a 
service (Saas)  
Consumer can access and use provider software. 
Provider is responsible for all security. 
Platform as a 
service (PaaS) 
Consumer can create programs using provider-
approved methods and deploy applications into the 
cloud. Consumer is responsible for application security. 
Infrastructure as 
a service (IaaS) 
Consumer has power to build, modify and maintain 
servers. Consumer is responsible for all privacy and 
security considerations. 
 
Software as a service (SaaS) would allow use of specific software or 
interface. From a user’s perspective, this model does not allow specific 
configuration. Interfaces would remain fixed. SaaS is a common model used for 
access to Electronic health records (EHR) and electronic medical records (EMR). 
Confidentiality, integrity, availability, and authentication (CIA-A)198 of data and 
information are the responsibility of the vendor or SaaS service provider.  
The platform as a service (PaaS) model facilitates more flexibility by 
allowing the user to create useful applications and interfaces. PaaS provides 
organizations and users with the capability to develop and test their own 
applications. Upon provider approval, they can integrate these applications into 
the interface. The negative aspect to the PaaS model is that only the provider 
can approve interface implementations. 
Infrastructure as a service (IaaS) allows the maximum control of the 
servers, software development, and implementation. It still follows the distributed 
cloud based architecture. By increasing the flexibility to an IaaS, the consumer is 
now the provider. Now, the consumer is responsible for all aspects of security 
and privacy from the virtual servers and storage to application security. Although 
IaaS is the most powerful and flexible cloud-based model of service, it requires 
                                            
197. Wayne Jansen and Timothy Grance, Guidelines on Security and Privacy in Public Cloud 
Computing, National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication (NIST SP 800–
144) (Gaithersburg, MD. December 2011), 4. 
198. Shon Harris, All-In-One CISSP Exam Guide, ed.4 (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2008). 
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the most overhead, administration, and cost to the consumer. Depending on their 
prescribed functions and operation, very large organizations with an existing 
enterprise network may benefit from moving some or all aspects of their network 
to an IaaS model.  
Table 5.   Cloud Deployment Models.199 
Service Models Access Granted 
Private Cloud Use: Single Organization 
Management: Internal or external organization. 
Location: Local or remote 
Community 
Cloud 
Use: Specific Community 
Management: Single organization, multiple organizations, 
or external organization. 
Location: Local or remote 
Public Cloud Use: Open to the public 
Management: Business, academy, government 
Location: Cloud provider premises 
Hybrid Cloud A combination of two or more deployment models which 
are typically unique. 
 
3. Private Community Disaster Relief Plans and Partnerships 
Regardless of proximate causation, the local government will always take 
the blame for a botched response to disaster relief. With this in mind, the custom 
interface designer must provide a means to share information with early 
responder organizations outside of their private communities while allowing the 
local government to remain in command and control (C2) of the relief effort. The 
example DR cloud model in Figure 20 provides community partnership capability 
to share information. Partnerships are typically specified using memorandums of 
understanding (MOUs) and service level agreements (SLAs).  
                                            
199. Wayne Jansen and Timothy Grance, Guidelines on Security and Privacy in Public Cloud 
Computing, National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication (NIST SP 800–
144) (Gaithersburg, MD. December 2011), 3, 4. 
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Figure 20.  Disaster Relief Cloud Deployment Model Example. 
Establishing disaster response plans will significantly reduce anarchy and 
chaos that occurs because of the disaster. Thus, it is important for organizations 
to develop a disaster response plan (DRP) and a contingency disaster response 
plan (CDRP). The DRP allows local governments to develop procedures that 
facilitate saving lives and expedite recovery within respective countries.200  
DRPs consider all aspects that deal with emergency response for the 
country. In the case of a very large-scale disaster, the government may or may 
not have the capability to effectively implement its DRP. As was experienced in 
Haiti in 2012, the government and UN were incapable of leading an effective 
                                            
200. Ready.gov, “Emergency Response Plan,” 19 December 2012, accessed 10 January 
2015, http://www.ready.gov/business/implementation/emergency. 
 76
relief effort.201 In situations such as this, a CDRP could provide continuity when 
the local government is not able to respond effectively.  
As most people understand, things do not always work as planned. 
However, having a countrywide DRP and CDRP would provide a framework by 
which local government and incident responders could modify or change the plan 
to meet the situation at hand. In line with General George S. Patton, “A good plan 
executed violently now, is better than a perfect plan executed next week.”202 
Having the framework in place could significantly reduce chaos, anarchy, and 
recovery time.  
A DR communication strategy supports the development and 
implementation of DRPs and CDRPs. Furthermore, the concepts introduced in 
this chapter support and encourage development of community wide DRPs and 
CDRPs. DRPs within a private community or a country, enumerates the 
processes for the disaster response system within the country. The CDRP 
designates what occurs in the event that the country is unable to effectively 
respond to the crisis. The CDRP spells out which partner organizations will be 
involved in the relief effort. The CDRP replicates the DRP processes, but it also 
establishes temporary leadership roles when the local government is unable to 
maintain C2 of the response. The temporary mission leader follows the 
procedures spelled out in the DRPs of the private communities and only uses the 
collaboration and integration tools authorized by the local government.  
Creation of the CDRP integrates partner organizations into the concept of 
operations before an incident occurs. When a disaster occurs, the DRP and 
CDRP guide the activities of participating mission teams. A clear understanding 
                                            
201. Brian Steckler, “Hastily Formed Networks for HA/DR.” Classroom Instruction (Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.  22 June–16 September 2014). 
202. General George S. Patton Jr., “Quotes,” accessed 13 January 2015, 
http://www.generalpatton.com/quotes/index.html. 
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of the roles and responsibilities of the DR mission teams combines relief efforts 
and presents an international based unified front for the DR.203  
Issues, mentioned throughout the AARs and in Larry Wentz’s comments, 
stress bandwidth saturation and the lack of a frequency management plan.204 
The preplanning that occurs during the development of the DRP and CDRP 
facilitates the creation of a frequency management plan. A local government 
dictated frequency management plan could potentially reduce some of the issues 
with bandwidth saturation and interference during disaster relief missions. Figure 
21 illustrates the proposed partnership concept, and Figure 22 represents the 
private community relationship model. 
 
Figure 21.  Service Level Agreement Partnership Concept. 
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Figure 22.  Private Community Relationship Model. 
4. Private Community Application Interface 
Some of the current web-based interfaces are extremely complicated and 
require significant time to learn how to use them effectively. The interface for DR 
missions should be highly intuitive. The user should not have to spend more than 
ten minutes learning the functionality of the interface. As such, some sort of 
instructional self-help and technical support options may be required. The 
following represent key functions of the interface: 
1. Account creation  
2. Interface command and control (C2) 
3. Integration  
4. Common operating picture 
5. Disaster alert system   
Figure 23 provides a visual (notional) representation of the DR interface.   
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Figure 23.  Example Private Community Interface. 
a. Interface Account Creation 
Account creation for private community interfaces is slightly different from 
traditional sites. The only way for a user to obtain access to an account within a 
private community is through organizational referral. Before the creation of the 
interface, the community owner (country government or organization) must 
designate individuals to serve as account managers. Account managers that are 
appointed should be working in a human resources or management role within 
the organization. This places the responsibility of user verification on the local 
governments. Accounts are restricted to government employees and critical 
disaster relief entities. Designated organization owners must approve or deny 
accounts outside the government. Each private organization may coordinate with 
the trusted organization to establish an account vetting system. 
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b. Interface Command and Control 
The community manager or designated representatives dictate the 
functionality and tools of their interface. The trusted organization implements and 
manages the interface in accordance with community interface owner 
specifications. The private community owner (local government or organization 
manager) dictates the collaborative and organizational tools used for disaster 
response within its country. When external entities and partners elect to 
participate in the mission, they must use the designated tools indicated in the 
SLA of the affected country. 
The community planning product section provides a space local to the 
interface where planning and collaboration can take place. The community 
products are only accessible within the community. The government or owner of 
the private community can dictate information shared with partners based on the 
SLA of each partner. The key buttons within the community planning section are 
DRPs and frequency management plan (FMP).  
User tutorial and help options buttons are available within the interface. 
This feature allows the user to go through a ten-minute tutorial on using the 
interface and review the options available within the interface. Upon completion 
of the tutorial, the user has access to Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) and 
technical support request sections. This section also contains contact information 
for an interface support section managed by the new organization. 
The DRP and FMP sections are standard for each interface. The 
community owner can choose to upload their DRPs and FMPs to the site. This 
section also comes equipped with a DRP and FMP creation tutorial. In the event 
that the organization owner does not have a DRP of FMP, they can create the 
products using an automated process. Once the automated process is complete, 
the process generates a workflow process to allow for DRP and FMP approval 
process.  
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There are numerous additional features available within the community for 
planning and continuity. The government or community owner dictates the 
additional features available within the community planning section. The 
community planning section and tutorial sections are located on the upper left 
hand side of Figure 24. 
 
Figure 24.  Mobile Application Interface.205 
c. Integration with Existing 4C Products 
Many organizations have developed inventive products for collaboration 
and communication for DR. With all of these tools available to DR mission teams, 
data becomes disparate and distributed among competing provider’s solutions. 
Rather than creating a new tool, this model proposes an integration concept for 
collaboration and communications tools. This interface concept supports the use 
                                            
205. Folsom, Eric and Brooks King, Private Community Concept Model, Naval Postgraduate 
School, February 2014. 
 82
of existing solutions for 4C. Integration of existing 4C solutions for governments 
and organizations occurs during the initial private community planning process. 
This allows DR users access to commonly used tools for DR missions within the 
common private community interface. Integration facilitates moving data to the 
private community when and if the community owner desires.   
The integration concept includes developing an application repository. 
When governments and organizations require specific DR tools, the trusted 
organization must work with existing 4C providers to facilitate product integration. 
During the development of integration applications, users may require access to 
their preferred 4C products. Each user can add private links to preferred tools to 
the awaiting development container of the interface. Once the application is 
ready for use, the requesting user’s organization receives notification, and it 
becomes available in the interface application repository. A repository structure 
also allows partner organizations to incorporate the use of designated tools as 
needed for DR missions. 
In addition to integrating existing solutions, governments and 
organizations can integrate their existing traditional infrastructure with the 
interface. The trusted organization can work with each private community to 
provide a federated identity and single sign-on solution.206  
d. Common Operational Picture 
A common operational picture (COP) provides a means for the 
government and community to monitor the efforts of DR teams. The Pacific 
Disaster Center’s (PDC) DisasterAware software provides the capability for real-
time situation reporting; if internationally accepted, it could potentially serve as a 
viable COP solution provider. Unfortunately, the lack of trust and social 
complexity with the DR system has rendered international COP participation for 
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DR ineffective.207 Instead of creating another COP solution, this thesis proposes 
an integration solution to COP.  
As with most features in this interface concept, the owner of the private 
community dictates the mapping solution. This model supports map service 
provider neutrality. As long as the designated map provider has an application 
programming interface (API), the trusted organization can attempt to negotiate 
integration into the interface. The integration can ensure that data normalization 
is seamless to the user and the map datum is proliferated throughout the private 
community interface. Integration enables data normalization between the map 
provider and the integration interface. Once the integration occurs, government 
approved partner organizations have access to a common operating picture 
using their selected map provider.  
An important step with the creation of this COP concept is to facilitate use 
of the interface in constrained bandwidth situations. Although 3G and 4G cellular 
technologies allow access to web-based interfaces via mobile phone, the cellular 
networks often become over-saturated when disasters occur. During Hurricane 
Ike in 2008, AT&T cellular service was flooded throughout Southwest 
Louisiana.208 Because of the cellular congestion, AT&T implemented an 
automated message saying all circuits were currently busy.209 In addition to 
diminished voice calls, SMS was also intermittent in the area.210 Because of 
situations like Hurricane Ike, it is important to have other options for mobile 4C 
that do not rely on cellular service.     
The common operational picture is very important for DR as it forms the 
basis for the mission. The ability to view the actual or projected position of a 
mission team is powerful. This functionality could mitigate some potential issues 
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indicated in AARs and reports. If a DR mission team can view areas and other 
responders, they could potentially identify and deploy to areas with limited to no 
relief support. Teams deploying to an area in need of support could result in 
saving additional lives. The stars in Figure 25 indicate areas that need support; a 
DR team that possesses the resources needed could attempt to provide support 
to the entity. This could increase the productivity of individual mission teams as 
well as the collective relief effort. 
 
Figure 25.  Mobile Application Interface.211 
e. Disaster Alert System 
At the current time, there is no internationally recognized DR alert system. 
However, the Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) is coming quite close to 
international acceptance. Without an internationally accepted alerting solution for 
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international DR missions, there is no way to establish a condition level for the 
relief effort. The interface provides a disaster alert matrix and condition elevation 
schema. The disaster relief elevation matrix in Appendix D provides a 
government managed alert system model for each private community.  
The DR alert matrix places the responsibility of disaster response and 
disaster relief support on the local government. Each category has its respective 
authority levels and support categories. The example of a hypothetical situation 
below assumes that DRPs and CDRPs are established, that the government is 
using the interface, and that the U.S. Military serves as temporary C2 for the DR 
event. 
A massive 9.0 earthquake wipes out the buildings and infrastructure of 
Cuba. The President and government leadership of Cuba is either dead or 
trapped beneath the rubble. There is no distinct leadership; chaos ensues.  
In Santa Clara, one city official and several firefighters escaped from the 
building before it collapsed. The current disaster matrix status remains at level 1 
of 5. After trying to contact higher government echelons, the official accesses the 
alert matrix to raise the level appropriately. Based on his assessment, the 
disaster level is elevated to level 5 of 5.  
Private community partners and the U.S. government are automatically 
notified when the disaster level is raised. Based on Cuba’s CDRP, the U.S. 
Military deploys and provides contingency C2 for the relief effort.  
Although this is not a likely scenario for the model, the potential to have 
this effect is resident within the interface concept. Since the private community 
CDRP was in place for this scenario, no additional bureaucracy was required to 
deploy and provide DR. Having a contingency disaster relief plan in place will 
eliminate some of the confusion, chaos, and anarchy within the DR system. 
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5. Mobile Application Interface 
The prolific nature of today’s network technologies warrants provision of a 
platform non-specific integrated interface. Accessibility to the interface using 
mobile devices is paramount. Mobile devices represent an inexpensive 
alternative to large ICT solutions when cellular service is available.  
In many of the disasters, cellular networks and critical communication 
infrastructure go down; the only access to communications is via satellite. Mobile 
Global Positioning System (GPS-based) ICTs are an option when cellular 
services are unavailable. GPS-based systems, such as Delorme, inReach, and 
SPOT allow the subscriber to send position information and a 160-character text 
message. Traditional web-based interfaces may not be accessible on GPS 
devices. 
For mobile devices to communicate directly with the DR interface, the new 
organization must work with GPS ICT providers to develop a custom mobile 
application. Since the devices are GPS-based with onboard maps, viewing a 
private community COP would only require the transfer of metadata for reports 
and team positions.  
The map portion of the interface provides normalized input and output for 
situational reports. A method of slimming down inputs for situational reporting 
allows only a unique ID field, GPS position field, and a details field consisting of 
no more than 160 characters. This reporting limitation may facilitate bi-directional 
traffic from mobile devices to the integrated mapping interfaces.  
Incorporating mobile devices also supports an inexpensive prepositioning 
capability. Prepositioning mobile devices in critical locations, throughout 
countries or areas that experience frequent disasters, could significantly increase 
DR response quality. In some cases, this could reduce the time it takes to 
receive damage assessments from remote areas that have limited capability and 
funding. Within minutes after an earthquake occurs, or as the eye of the storm 
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passes over an area, a report generation is possible. Figure 26 provides an 
example of a potential mobile application interface. 
 
Figure 26.  Mobile Application Interface.212 
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 CYBERSECURITY V.
Large-scale, layered security mechanisms influence usability, functionality, 
and access to resources. This strategy proposes the development of a baseline 
security plan. A security plan specifies the system security requirements and the 
measures implemented to meet the requirements.213 In addition, a security plan 
specifies responsibilities within the organization and defines acceptable systems 
usage.214   
The primary purpose behind providing ICT capability is to facilitate 
communication between mission teams. Introducing security plans that occupy 
bandwidth in a bandwidth-limited environment may prove to be counter-
productive. A communications strategy implemented without an overall security 
plan leaves DR mission teams vulnerable to cyber-attack.  
Developing a security plan and implementing security mechanisms and 
measures within the DR system represents a technical and social challenge. The 
international community may not support unified security policies. Because of 
this, the security requirements and policies of each private community will differ 
significantly.  
It is also a technical challenge because the model presented in this thesis 
is conceptual in nature. For this model, the trusted organization is responsible for 
security of data resident on private community interfaces. In addition, the 
organization is responsible for ensuring the data is bi-directionally secure from 
the IaaS systems to the private community users.  
Because of societal differences and incomplete design specifications, a 
discussion of all security requirements and security controls is not possible. The 
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security section discusses some general security considerations for common 
issues among disparate implementations.  
A. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY SECURITY 
This security strategy supports a bring-your-own ICT (BYO ICT) concept. 
BYO ICT allows DR mission teams to procure communication capabilities that 
best support their organizational needs. ICTs function as 4C enablers and are 
primarily concerned with sending and receiving traffic. Since the focus of ICT is 
to facilitate 4C, one of the major concerns is securing data in transit to prevent 
adversary access to responder position and situation information.  
Transport Layer Security (TLS) represents a simple solution for securing 
data-in-transit. TLS provides a reliable, secure connection for cryptographic key 
exchange and encryption of data-in-transit.215 TLS provides confidentiality and 
message integrity through implementing symmetric, pre-shared keys.216 It also 
allows the use of asymmetric cryptography for authentication.217  
ICT mobile solutions present their own breadth of vulnerabilities. Mobile 
ICTs may consist of a combination of phones, tablets, PDAs, GPS devices, and 
items such as BRCK.218 Due to the variety of systems, a feasible solution for 
securing data-in-transit for mobile ICTs is to develop a secure mobile application 
for each platform. The application requires user authentication and encryption for 
two-way transfer of situational information between the device and the integrated 
private community interface. Most financial mobile applications require single 
factor authentication but add extra single factor security to verify user identities. 
USAA federal savings bank adds personal identification numbers (PIN), security 
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questions, and phone number affiliation to match online personas with account 
holders. These techniques add additional security measures but still rely on 
single factor authentication techniques.219 With mobile devices, multi-factor 
authentication may be the best option for ensuring confidentiality, integrity, 
availability, and authenticity (CIA-A).220  
Additional considerations for mobile devices are physical access and 
protection of data-at-rest. Mobile devices are generally small and can be easily 
lost or stolen. If an adversary can obtain physical access to a mobile device, he 
or she can likely gain access to the resident data. Adding additional security 
layers, such as device access codes and drive level encryption would make it 
more difficult for adversaries to gain access to the device. 
Some ICT platforms allow users to communicate using Wi-Fi and 
Bluetooth technologies. These technologies provide communications flexibility 
and represent an integral functionality for DR mission teams. Most Wi-Fi access 
points employed in these packages provide methods to protect data-in-transit 
using common encryption standards. Depending on when the device was 
developed, some ICTs rely on obsolete encryption standards.  
The 9201 model BGAN in use for HFN relies on Wired Electronic Privacy 
(WEP) to protect data-in-transit over the local area network. The use of obsolete 
standards empowers adversaries with the capability to intercept and decrypt 
data-in-transit. DR mission teams need to be aware of encryption standards used 
in their packages and should replace legacy devices with an improved version 
when resident encryption standards become obsolete. As of 2010, it only takes 
three seconds to crack a 104-bit WEP key and sixty seconds to crack Wi-Fi 
Protected Access (WPA) using Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) 
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algorithm.221, 222  As of 2013, the best wireless security standard available to the 
public is WPA2 Pre Shared Key (PSK) using Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES) encryption.223, 224 It is important to understand that WPA2 PSK requires 
administration and management. As a BYO ICT concept, private community 
owners are responsible for ensuring that approved ICT packages conform to 
industry encryption standards.    
Some ICT platforms incorporate the use of the WiMAX (802.16) 
technology. WiMAX systems provide a broadband network connection over large 
distances using wireless line of site propagation (10–66 Ghz) or non-line of site 
(6–10 Ghz) using advanced modulation for mobile base station configuration.225 
WiMAX supports point-to-point, point-to-multipoint, multi-hop relay, and mobile 
configurations.226 The system protects data-in-transit through use of security 
associations, X.509 digital certificates, and authorization keys to verify Base 
Stations (BS) and Subscriber Stations (SS).227 Despite its enhanced security 
protection mechanisms, WiMAX is still vulnerable to RF jamming, base station 
impersonation, and eavesdropping. To reduce exposure to the adversary, DR 
teams should ensure that they use the highest available encryption standards. 
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Furthermore, process and policy based security controls can help to counter 
additional vulnerabilities.228  
The information contained in the previous section only discusses security 
vulnerabilities identified during previous DR after action reports. There are other 
vulnerabilities specific to ICT implementation that should be researched and 
addressed. It is also important to understand that as ICT capability and 
functionality increases, additional vulnerabilities may arise. 
B. RESPONSIBILITY AND INTERFACE DESIGN IMPLICATIONS 
Many organizations and governments have existing security policies and 
security controls that help protect their current enterprise solution. The custom 
managed interface supports existing policies and security controls while allowing 
integration into the network using a federated identity management solution.  
1. Service Agreement and Joint Responsibilities 
The trusted organization serves as an external service provider to all 
organization owners. The customers (private community owners) subscribe to 
services from the external service provider (the trusted organization) that fall 
“outside of the traditional security authorization boundaries (physical or logical) 
established by the customer organization.”229 Customers or stakeholders who 
desire access to the integrated interface work with the trusted organization to 
develop a custom private community for each government and DR organization.  
A service agreement (SA) is created between the trusted organization and 
private community owners to identify the level of service and indicate specific 
roles and responsibilities. The SA outlines and specifies general security policies 
and controls for the community. The SA serves as a baseline for the organization 
and assures the community owner that their data is protected. The policies and 
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security controls, specified in the provider SA, apply to the entire community. The 
mutually approved SA provides the specifications for creating the detailed design 
document.  
The detailed design document establishes guidelines for each community, 
map provider of choice, storage requirements, and existing 4C solutions that 
require integration. The trusted organization negotiates with existing 4C providers 
to provide integration support for the private community owner. This custom 
packaged interface allows the DR community owner to continue to use existing 
4C solutions while accessing the products in a private community common 
interface.  
Moving services to the cloud has many benefits, but significant additional 
vulnerabilities arise as a result. To protect community and user information, 
extensive time and thought must take place to deal with privacy and security 
issues.230 The trusted organization must also ensure that the IaaS service 
provider provides detailed delineation of security boundaries. Applications are 
developed and tested prior to migrating integration applications to the repository.  
2. Trusted Organization Limitations  
The trusted organization is not responsible for security of the information 
that resides on the integrated solution provider’s sites. Many DR organizations 
already use cloud based storage and collaboration tools. As such, the trusted 
organization is only responsible for the data resident within each private 
community within the limitations of the SA and detailed design document. The 
trusted organization is never responsible for verification of user identities. Prior to 
the creation of the private community interface, proposed community owners 
would need to have identity verification measures in place. Most governments 
and organizations have procedures to properly vet identities for their employees. 
The governments and organizations would dictate authorized users within their 
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organization. The private community owner is responsible for vetting users and 
account management after the interface comes online. Private community 
owners negotiate with the trusted organization to identify what constitutes 
acceptable use for interface users.  
The trusted organization cannot control individual user machines on an 
organization’s corporate network, nor can they control a DR team’s ICT 
implementation. Security, from the end user to the interface, represents the 
largest vulnerability to this concept model.  
3. Final Notes for Private Community and Interface Security 
The trusted organization must take a proactive approach to ensure the 
confidentiality and integrity of system data. To prevent potential future attacks, 
the organization must monitor for malicious activity, from the IaaS to the interface 
user, in order to identify and take corrective actions. They must clearly delineate 
between non-partner private communities to prevent unauthorized disclosure or 
access to customer information. To remain trusted, the organization must secure 
the data but remain open and transparent to private community subscribers. 
Allowing designated private community administrators access to a security 
dashboard may establish some level of transparency and trust. The trusted 
organization must ensure that security controls are in place to protect and 
prevent unauthorized access to private community interfaces. 
The concepts in this thesis only discuss a few fundamental security 
measures but have left many others for future work. As such, the concepts 
should be fully developed based on a Systems Thinking perspective. Further 
research and development of the concepts discussed will enable the creation of 
a comprehensive security solution that fits within the DR system. 
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Natural disasters can affect all inhabitants of this planet. As such, 
stakeholders should work together to provide effective international disaster relief 
(DR) capabilities that reduce the duration of relief mission support and increase 
victim survival rates.  
International DR efforts represent a socially complex wicked problem. 
Because of DR’s wicked nature, previous solutions developed to resolve issues 
fail to achieve their intended impact. Previous solutions have addressed aspects 
of communication, coordination, cooperation, and collaboration (4C) capability. 
However, they have only addressed symptoms of the system-level problem. As 
such, the solutions resulted in information overload, information disparity, 
bandwidth saturation, and a disjointed response effort. To develop a solution that 
would succeed, planners must better understand the DR system and its related 
components.  
The Systems Thinking process represents a model where planners can 
attain a better understanding of the DR system and its interdependencies. In its 
current state, the DR system is destined to remain in an uncompromising vicious 
cycle. Using the Systems Thinking process, the variables that affect the system 
are as follows: scope of the disaster, number of DR mission teams, social 
complexity, anarchy, response quality, and stress.  
The variables anarchy and social complexity negatively impact the 
system. Because of its impact significance, anarchy is the dominant system-level 
problem variable. Reducing system-level anarchy will significantly improve 
response quality, reduce overall stress, and potentially reduce the scope of the 
disaster.  
Previous solutions for DR 4C increased capability, provided organization, 
and enabled collaboration. Because these solutions addressed symptoms of the 
problem, it is possible, that combining these solutions could lead to the 
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development of a valid system-level solution. Based on the Systems Thinking 
process findings, the injection point is the number of DR mission teams; and the 
4C variables form the balancing loop. To truly reduce system-level anarchy, all 
four variables of the balancing loop must function synergistically. An 
internationally accepted communication strategy designed to support open and 
transparent 4C provides a means to reduce information anarchy. Reducing 
information anarchy can potentially reduce the impact significance of DR system-
level anarchy.   
The communication strategy concept proposed involves creating a trusted 
organization to manage cloud based private community interfaces, support the 
BYO ICT concept, and provide integration support for existing 4C solutions. 
Establishing a trusted organization to manage the interface could reduce  
existing DR based biases and creates a neutral entity for partner-to-partner  
negotiations. Establishing a completely neutral entity is not likely; however, a new 
organization’s lack of an existing DR history or reputation may be sufficient to 
obtain international acceptance.   
Due to the vast number of stakeholders, there is no way to dictate an ideal 
ICT solution for DR mission teams. Instead, the communication strategy supports 
the bring-your-own (BYO) ICT concept and provides some potential solution 
model examples based on the metrics of deployment, cost, and security. The 
three solutions are ICT Mobile, ICT Lite, and ICT Standard. 
ICT Mobile is highly deployable and inexpensive but requires coordination 
with vendors to develop acceptable encryption for data-in-transit. ICT Mobile is 
designed for single person use or as designated as a contingency 
communications solution.  
ICT Lite is highly deployable, significantly more expensive, and generally 
comes with features to secure data-in-transit. DR mission teams should ensure 
that their ICT Lite system does not rely on obsolete encryption standards. ICT 
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Lite provides service for up to eleven personnel using a minimum of one Wi-Fi 
access point. 
ICT Standard is deployable, very expensive, and can come with additional 
security appliances. ICT Standard provides the most flexibility, but package cost 
is relative to desired service plan and organizational requirements. 
The second part of the strategy proposes implementation of a cloud-based 
model that supports application development. The trusted organization provides 
integration application programming and community interface development in a 
PaaS service and hybrid deployment model. The DR stakeholders obtain access 
to the offered interface from the trusted organization using SaaS service and 
hybrid deployment model. The model allows the organization to focus on 
providing quality IT and integration services, while the DR stakeholders can 
develop operational content and service level agreements (SLAs) with desired 
partners. This model also supports and encourages the creation of disaster 
response plans (DRPs), collaboration with partners to create contingency 
disaster response plans (CDRPs), and establishing frequency management 
plans for communities and selected partners.  
  When DR teams initially deploy to the disaster area, their primary 
objective is to coordinate with local government to determine where help is 
required. This officially identifies local government as C2 for the relief effort. 
Unfortunately, this does not always occur. The second part of the strategy 
supports identifying local government as the primary communications coordinator 
and C2 through the creation of private community interfaces for each country, 
government, and organization. For teams to participate in DR within the affected 
country, they must obtain approval from local government and agree to use the 
local government’s interface tools. Private community interfaces allow the local 
government, or its designated C2 contingency, to guide DR operations from start 
to finish. The private community and C2 concept add structure, organization, and 
reduce both information and general anarchy with the DR system. Since 
participating teams must use the designated DR tools, standing DRPs, CDRPs, 
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and frequency management plans of the respective private community interface, 
the impact of information fragmentation is negligible.  
The third part of the strategy involves creating a mobile application 
interface. The principle behind the mobile application is to provide similar 
capabilities to mobile users using bandwidth-restricted devices. The mobile 
interface proposes creating an application that would allow information to be sent 
and received while requiring minimal bandwidth. The mobile application requires 
locally resident device maps. The only traffic sent or received is a unique 
identification code, location information, and a text message of up to 160 
characters. This limitation will allow use of existing GPS device functionality while 
facilitating participation in the DR event using the local government’s private 
community interface in near real time. The use of GPS for communications also 
negates some of the bandwidth saturation issues experienced during DR 
missions. 
The final part of this strategy discussed the security considerations. The 
author has no control over what ICT solution or end devices each DR team or 
organization uses. Without an understanding of what is on the network, it is 
impossible to develop a sound security plan. Instead of proposing a security plan, 
this strategy briefly discusses the security concerns of the design and prototypes 
explained. The design-specific concerns cover identity verification, account 
management, encryption of data for the community interface, encryption 
standards used for ICTs, and private community roles and responsibilities. 
This thesis examined disaster relief AARs, assessed DR as a system, 
discovered a system-level injection point, developed a strategy that considered 
all components of the system, and introduced strategy concepts that could result 
in significantly improving the current DR system.   
A. LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The concepts discussed in Chapter IV and V address key features for 
consideration when developing an international communications strategy for DR. 
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It does not constitute a full solution for the problem within the DR system. 
Disregarding the concepts discussed in Chapter IV and V may result in failure of 
all subsequent solutions to address the DR system-level problem. Further 
research and development is required to ensure that the strategy obtains 
international acceptance and successfully reduces system-level anarchy without 
significant social implications. In addition, further deliberation and development of 
these concepts should warrant international DR stakeholder participation. 
B. TOPICS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
From the author’s point of view, the proposed communication strategy 
represents a realistic model using existing technology. Possible future works 
include the following areas of research. 
Hastily Formed Networks need to incorporate a layered approach to 
security. This approach should introduce mechanisms that account for all layers 
of the OSI or TCPIP models. Upgrading hardware that currently relies on 
obsolete encryption standards, incorporating wireless intrusion detection (WIDS), 
wireless intrusion prevention (WIPS), network security policies, and acceptable 
use policies are all requisites sound security posture. Researchers should ensure 
that all solutions developed are derived using a systems perspective. Doing this 
ensures that security features implemented do not impair the NPS HFN team’s 
ability to participate in international 4C. 
Another topic for further research is creating the detailed design document 
for the private community interface concept that would result in the use of cutting-
edge technology. Although this thesis touches on some of the major issues with 
DR 4C, it does not provide a full solution to the problems within the DR system.  
The creation of a third-party trusted organization constitutes another area 
requiring further research. Applicable areas of interest are organization or 
business type, future cloud models, organization diversity, and alternate sources 
for funding (social innovation funds). Any solution proposed should lean heavily 
on understanding the social implications of the DR system.    
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Development of a model that supports two-way communications with a 
single integration interface is another topic for further research. Some of the valid 
areas of research are as follows: integration applications repository, development 
of mobile applications for GPS devices, development of APIs for existing 4C 





Appendix A provides detailed steps for the Systems Thinking process. The 
Systems Thinking process reviewed in Chapter III, only introduces key products 
of the process. All steps and work done to assess the DR system are included in 
this Appendix.  
A.  SYSTEMS THINKING PROCESS DRAFT PRODUCTS 
Initial Narrative: The anarchy created in the aftermath of a natural disaster 
is uncompromising. The lack of international legislation and designated C2, result 
in increasing the level of anarchy associated with disaster relief (DR).231 
DR mission teams deploy to provide the assistance and resources for 
disaster relief to the local first responders, governments, and victims.232 When a 
disaster occurs, there is extensive damage to the infrastructure of cities, homes, 
and the environment. Many times the debris and damage to infrastructure and 
roads make it difficult for responders to move to locations for 4C participation. 
Social complexity and anarchy also play a major role in forming barriers to 
effective 4C.  
As DR mission teams arrive, the social complexity of the relief effort 
increases, reducing the desire and capability for teams to participate effectively in 
4C activities. This lack of effective communication creates a sense of chaos, in 
which these teams attempt to correct through assuming command of the relief 
effort in their areas.233 The individual efforts of the teams and assumption of 
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command, limits the scope of the individual team’s response and decreases the 
need for 4C between the participating teams. This, in turn, leaves areas that 
need support without aid for a longer period, resulting in preventable victim 
injuries, deaths, and destruction.  
Table 6.   Identification, Consolidation and Elimination Steps.  
Identification Consolidation Elimination 
Disaster/Catastrophe Catastrophe Scope 
of the Disaster 
Scope of the Disaster 
Response  Response 
Capability Number 
of HA/DR Teams 
Number of DR mission teams 
Communication Communication Response Quality 
Coordination Coordination Anarchy 
Collaboration Collaboration Social Complexity 
Information Anarchy Information Anarchy Stress 
Capability Capability  
Shortfalls Shortfalls  
Social Complexity Social Complexity  
Security Security  
Stability Stability  
Victim Survivability Victim Survivability  
Damage  Damage   
Relief/Aid provided  Relief/Aid provided   
Response Quality Response Quality   















Table 7.   The Redefined Variables for Disaster Relief.  
Variables Redefining Variables 
Scope of the 
Disaster 
The degree of damage and level of impact that the physical and 
emotional damage have on the victims of the disaster. The 
actions of all stakeholders and victims affect the speed and 
efficiency of recovery operations.  
Number of DR 
Mission Teams 
Contingent upon severity of incident. The number of DR mission 
teams and capability required, in order to, facilitate an efficient 
and effective relief. 
Response 
Quality 
The overall quality of service provided by the mission teams 
combined.    
Anarchy Ultimate state of disorder, uncertainty, instability, insecurity, and 
identification of leadership. 
Social 
Complexity 
Humans tend to react in a certain manner based on their 
individual experiences, beliefs, morals, and values. These 
reactions are also based upon the norms, values, and belief 
systems of their country, state, city, and origin.  




Figure 27.  Timeline for Disaster Relief Missions. 
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Figure 28.  Disaster Relief Variable Relationship Over Time. 
 
Figure 29.  The Initial Causal Loop Diagram. 
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Communications The communications variable encompasses all forms of 
communication. This includes verbal, written, signaled, and 
electronic communication methods. 
Coordination The coordination variable encompasses, organizing efforts 
between disparate groups, in preparation for participation in 
an activity. Coordination works to prevent individual or group 
actions from interfering with the actions of other individuals 
and groups. 
Cooperation Cooperation encompasses coordination on a larger scale 
and occurs when organizations work together for a common 
beneficial outcome.    
Collaboration Collaboration encompasses the act of organizations working 
together and sharing information in order to generate a 
product or system. The product or system modifies, 
improves, or changes an existing system or process. 




Figure 30.  Final Disaster Relief Causal Loop Diagram. 
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APPENDIX B  
Appendix B contains the Rapid Technology Assessment Team executive 
summary. It provides an overview of the specifics related to RTAT. 
 
Rapid Technology Assessment Teams (RTAT) 
Executive Summary 
25 October 2012 
 
Overview 
Information and communication technology (ICT) and power sectors are critical 
to the response after major disasters. Currently existing, post disaster 
assessments focus on areas other than ICT, power and Information Sharing. A 
rapid assessment of the ICT status will enable the host nation and the 
International humanitarian community to provide a targeted allocation of 
resources and result in a reduction of gaps and duplication of effort. The Rapid 
Technology Assessment Teams (RTAT) concept seeks to provide a pool of 
multidisciplinary experts who will rapidly deploy to the disaster zone to provide 
this information. The RTAT concept is supported by many organizations and 
individuals within the ICT disaster response community and is in the process of 
obtaining further funding. A crucial part of the development of the initiative is to 
gather support for the adoption of the concept by key disaster prone countries. 
Their involvement will enable RTAT to tailor responses based on specific country 
needs and to ensure that processes and operations will be as effective as 
possible.   
The Problem: 
The first hours and days after the onset of major global disasters are typically 
fraught with chaos and lack of situational awareness.  While there are existing 
disaster assessment teams from major organizations that deploy to such events, 
these teams primarily focus on sector specialty areas other than ICT and 
Information Sharing.  The ICT sector is critically important as it enables and 
supports all others.     
Arrival of the global response community usually brings a welcome and powerful 
ICT capacity, but sometimes their arrival and the accompanying ICT equipment 
and capabilities do not link effectively with the host nations ICT or each other. 
This means that the effectiveness of the combined available resources is not 
maximized, leading to gaps and duplication.  
Additionally, sometimes the host country has not requested international 
assistance after a disaster. In this case, the disasters have often been managed 
internally with requests only made for specific assistance, which can cause the 
host nation’s resources to be stretched and unable to provide an accurate 
assessment of ICT and power needs. Complete ICT information is critical to 
 110
obtaining targeted support that will enable the response, business recovery, and 
minimize the effects of the disaster on the population. 
Specific problems include: 
In the immediate aftermath of a major disaster, there is often a gap in the 
knowledge of ICT infrastructure and a lack of communication between the 
International Humanitarian Community (IHC) and the affected state’s national 
infrastructure.  
What Exists Now: 
There are teams that currently perform some very basic ICT assessment 
functions. Some of these teams are on standby to deploy rapidly in 12 -24 hours.  
The United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) 
international emergency response system, whose core mandates are 
assessment, coordination, and information management to assist the UN and 
governments in an emergency. 
The Emergency Telecommunications Cluster (ETC) 
The International Federation of Red Cross/Red Crescent (IFRC) First 
Assessment and Coordination Teams (FACT) 
ICT based NGO’s such as NetHope and TSF have some assessment 
responsibilities. 
The Requirement: 
The proposed solution would create the ability to rapidly deploy small, nimble, 
multi-organizational, multi-national integrated assessment teams of specialists in 
key ICT areas such as wireless data communications, voice communications, 
radio technologies, power, information sharing, social networking, etc. The real 
niche this program represents is that the teams can be made up of experts from 
a variety of different organizations such as industry, UN, NGO, academia, 
International Organizations, affected nation government/military, and 
international governments/militaries.   
Once a comprehensive overview of the ICT situation has been established, a 
priority list of ICT needs can be drawn up in coordination with the host nation.  
The RTAT teams can also be requested to provide specific ICT disaster 
assessments in the event that full international assistance has not been 
requested by the host nation. 
The Teams Will Provide: 
Field data containing both host nation and IHC information as well as 
communications technology and power needs and capabilities. 
- Quality assessment of this information by experts and the distribution of reliable 
and trusted information. 
This Initiative does not seek to duplicate any existing process but to reinforce and 
enable the existing internationally accepted processes by meeting a need that is 
recognized but that is not currently being effectively met. By concentrating on 
human interfaces and not technology, the team of highly trained inter-
organizational personnel will identify and find answers to specific questions, 
compile a common operations picture and link with the host nation and the IHC 
enabling fast early recovery. 
 111
Specific requirements or capabilities include: 
Having the ability to quickly deploy (within 24 hours) 
Having direct links to local industry and government 
The ability to stay in the disaster zone 1–2 weeks, then reassess need to remain 
longer or to rotate in new teams 
The team having access to ICT expertise across the functional spectrum (ISP, 
cellular, data networks, power, etc.) with both the international technical 
community as well as local/national citizen experts 
Understanding the need to work in close collaboration with existing teams on the 
ground 
Team Makeup: 
Ideally, these small teams of experts would be composed of 1–2 representatives 
from each of the following organization types: UN, NGOs, International 
Government Organizations IGOs, academia, industry, military, and government 
agencies from around the world.  The formal/legal/business organizational 
makeup of the overall program and teams themselves would be determined by 
the founding member organizations.  
The leadership of the teams should be: 
Team Leader (from either the global or the regional technical community) 
National affected state Member (such as National Disaster Management Agency, 
Ministry of Communications or equivalent affiliated organizations) 
We still need to determine: 
Skill sets, qualifications, and exact number of people to make up each team 
Current thinking is to have government and/or industry experts from the ISP 
industry, the GSM/other cellular/landline industry, the power infrastructure 
industry, the wireless broadband industry, and the satellite communications 
industry. 
Teams Readiness Status: 
Small teams of qualified/trained experts from across the ICT spectrum are on 
24X7 stand-by to deploy as soon as possible but likely for 1–2 weeks in shifts.  
We believe that before deploying to a specific disaster zone there should be a 
BASELINE ICT/Info Sharing assessment capability in place. These assessments 
should be accomplished well ahead of time in each country prone to regular 
disasters. Such assessments could be done by RTAT supporting entities such as 
industry and academia. The benefits for such assessments, which would be 
provided to the host nation government, would go well beyond the RTAT concept 
and be able to point out potential general ICT vulnerabilities and resilience gaps 
to all concerned parties. 
Team  Locations: 
RTAT teams would be stationed at key locations around the world, perhaps 
modeled after the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination Teams program, or 
possibly as associate members of NetHope, the UN Emergency 
Telecommunications Cluster (ETC Cluster) or other similar teams. The host 
nation, UN agencies such as OCHA, WPF, or a regional entity such as ASEAN 
could call on these teams. 
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Timeline of RTAT Concept Development:  
In late 2011, we began work on a process of developing the concept, identifying 
founding member organizations, outlining team member qualifications forming 
the teams, training and exercising these teams, and iteratively refining the 
program. We believe that if a real-world disaster event happens any time in the 
near term future, and if the teams have been identified and the roles, 
responsibilities and operating procedures are sufficiently advanced, then there 
could be an opportunity to “jump start” the entire process by deploying to that real 
-world event. Caution of course would be needed to ensure this would not hinder 
but rather help the overall response efforts. 
 
Organizations That Have Helped Develop the RTAT Concept: 
UN/NGO Community: 
 - UN (UN-OCHA)          
 - UN (UN-World Food Program/ FITTEST)  
 - UN (Emergency Telecommunications Cluster (ETC))  
 - NetHope  
 - Demining NGO community  
 - Telecoms Sans Frontieres 
 -New Zealand Red Cross  
 - InSTEDD  
 - CrisisMappers.Net 
Industry: 
 - Cisco Systems 
 - Microsoft 
 - Global VSAT Forum 
 - Delorme 
 - Inmarsat Government Services, US, Inc. 
 - Oceus Networks 
 -MEDWEB 
Academia: 
 - Naval Postgraduate School (US) 
 - University of Texas 
 - San Diego State University 
 - National Defense University (US) 
Government/Military Community: 
 - U.S. Department of Defense 
 - Pacific Disaster Center 
 -Japan Resiliency Initiative 
 - International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM)  
 
Point of Contact: 
Brian Steckler, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey CA USA 
Cell:  831.402.1584 - Work: 831.656.3837 - steckler@nps.edu 
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APPENDIX C  
Appendix C contains the digital messages referenced in the body of the 
thesis. The email messages contained in this appendix are to provide validity to 
the claimed quotations in the body of the thesis. 
 
RE: A quick Question about satellite bandwidth saturation 
Lonnie Wilson  
Sent:Friday, December 12, 2014 11:27 AM 
To: Eric Folsom 
Cc: Brooks King  
    
  
Eric, 
“The issues that HA/DR has with bandwidth saturation occurred when lots of 
people with ICTs moved to the same location. I assume it is because they are all 
on the same frequency band and the subscribers set BW does not allow for that 
much congestion in the same area.” 
1.    Digital BW (in bps) is the fundamental limitation for any Communication 
System in a specific Frequency Band. 
2.    The Digital BW is assigned / utilized by the users; and when user 
demands / requirements exceed the Digital BW capability then saturation 
occurs. 
“As I was looking through some stuff I found a neat device called Delorme 
inReach Extreme. The device has the capability to send two-way text messages 
and location. The problem I am having issues with is that the center frequency 
range is GPS frequencies L-band 1100–1500 Mhz.” 
Key question: Does inReach rely on the same satellites for its GPS and 
communication capabilities? 
  
No, the inReach GPS and satellite communications components rely on different 
sets of satellites. The GPS component relies on the Global Positioning System, 
maintained by the U.S. government. inReach Communication capabilities rely on 
the Iridium satellite network. 
The inReach Extreme product uses the Iridium Global Satellite System. 
Iridium Communication between satellites and handsets is done using 
a TDMA and FDMA based system using L-band spectrum between 1,616 and 
1,626.5 MHz. 
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Iridium Communication System’s transmissions do not interfere with GPS unit 
operations. 
However, inReach Communication units have very low Digital BW capabilities. 
Certainly, messages are limited to 160 characters per message. I do not think 
this Digital BW is sufficient for this mission. 
“The data it would send and receive would be minimal, however, because BGAN 
(the primary device HA/DR teams use for connectivity) operates on 1.5 - 1.6605 
Ghz, I feel like the GPS frequencies could potentially become congested due to 
noise.” 
As stated above, GPS performance should not be degraded with these units. 
  
“… however, because BGAN (the primary device HA/DR teams use for 
connectivity) operates on 1.5 - 1.6605 Ghz …” 
The BGAN is a global satellite Internet network with telephony using portable 
terminals. The network is provided by Inmarsat Satellite Communication 
System and uses three geostationary satellites called I-4 to provide almost global 
coverage. 
From Wikipedia, Broadband Global Area Network for use on land. BGAN benefits 
from the new I-4 satellites to offer a shared-channel IP packet-switched service 
of up to 492 kbits / second (uplink and downlink speeds may differ and depend 
on terminal model) and a streaming-IP service from 32 up to X-Stream data rate 
(services depend on terminal model). X-Stream delivers the fastest, on demand 
streaming data rates from a minimum of 384 kbits / second up to around 450 
kbits / second. Most terminals also offer circuit-switched Mobile ISDN services at 
64 kbits/s and even low speed (4.8 kbits/s) voice etc., services. BGAN service is 
available globally on all I4 satellites. 
Inmarsat Communication does not interfere with GPS systems. 
For the Inmarsat I-4 implementation, these Digital BWs may not be sufficient for 
potentially large missions that you might be considering. 
  
I suggest you consider: The Inmarsat I-5 Ka-Band Global Xpress Network! 
Inmarsat I-5 satellites are used in the new Inmarsat Ka-band Global Xpress 
network. This network delivers high-speed mobile and fixed broadband services 
around the world at speeds of up to 50 Mbps. This Digital BW should be 
sufficient for the mission. 
 
 Lonnie A. Wilson, PhD. 
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APPENDIX D  
Appendix D contains figures from the text that did not legibly fit within the 
normal dimensions of a standard figure.  







                                            
234. Brooks King, Team Alternate Power Generation Comparison, phone conversations, 10–
29 January 2015.  
235. Brian Steckler, Team Alternate Power Generation Comparison, personal 
correspondence, 10–29 January 2015. 
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APPENDIX E  
Appendix E contains presentation slides from the Middlebury Institute of 
International Studies at Monterey (MIIS), Cyber Initiative. Brian Steckler gave a 
briefing on Hastily Formed Networks for HA/DR, and the author followed with a 
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